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In this paper, a comprehensive survey of authentication protocols for Internet of Things (IoT) is presented. Specifically more than
forty authentication protocols developed for or applied in the context of the IoT are selected and examined in detail.These protocols
are categorized based on the target environment: (1) Machine to Machine Communications (M2M), (2) Internet of Vehicles (IoV),
(3) Internet of Energy (IoE), and (4) Internet of Sensors (IoS). Threat models, countermeasures, and formal security verification
techniques used in authentication protocols for the IoT are presented. In addition a taxonomy and comparison of authentication
protocols that are developed for the IoT in terms of networkmodel, specific security goals, main processes, computation complexity,
and communication overhead are provided. Based on the current survey, open issues are identified and future research directions
are proposed.
1. Introduction
The forecasters believe that the Internet of Things (IoT)
holds great promise for many life-improving applications.
According to forecasts from Cisco Systems [1], by 2020, the
Internet will consist of over 50 billion connected things,
including sensors, actuators, GPS devices, mobile devices,
and all smart things that can be envisioned in the future.
Currently, IBM has decided to combine several products and
services into a product called IoT Solutions Practice [2] to
allow the customers to find all IBM IoT offers at the same
location. For example, IBM offers the Watson IoT platform
[3], which combines scanning, security, and blockchain
technology for authentication with a set of APIs such as
IBM’s SoftLayer cloud infrastructure [4]. The IoT can be
realized under three scopes, namely, Internet-oriented (mid-
dleware), things-oriented (sensors), and semantic-oriented
(knowledge) [5]. According to Atzori et al. [6], IoT can be
represented as a three-layered architectural model, which
consists of the application layer, the network layer, and the
sensing layer.
As shown in Figure 1, IoT has made its entrance in four
fields, including (1) Machine to Machine Communications
(M2M), (2) Internet of Vehicles (IoV), (3) Internet of Energy
(IoE), and (4) Internet of Sensors (IoS). M2M is a technology
crucial for the realization of IoT, which is based on different
protocols such as the protocol Stack [7]. The IoV is based
on the concept of Vehicular Cloud, which offers access to
the Internet, and is temporarily created by interconnecting
resources available on the vehicles along with Road Side
Units (RSUs) [8–10]. According to ARTEMIS-project [11],
the IoE is the connection of smart grids with the Internet
in order to enable intelligent control of energy production,
storage, and distribution. The IoS refers to the possibility of
connecting sensors with the Internet using ZigBee and other
Hindawi
Security and Communication Networks
Volume 2017, Article ID 6562953, 41 pages
https://doi.org/10.1155/2017/6562953
2 Security and Communication Networks
Data ow
Data ow
Pow ow
Smart
E-Vehicle
Hotspot Service
Charging station
Control center (CC)
Control center
Control ow
Vehicle to grid (V2G) network
Vehicle to grid
Notations
(V2G) network
Generation
Transmission
Distribution
Customers
Machine
Machine
SCADA system
Socialspot
User
User to user communication
User to socialspot communication
Gateway
Gateway
Internet
Http://www . . .
Internet of Vehicles (IoV)
Internet of Sensors (IoS)
Machine
Machine to Machine Communications (M2M)
Internet of Energy (IoE)
· · ·
．！．X
＂！．X
Figure 1: Internet of Things (IoT) in four environments, including: (1) Internet of Vehicles (IoV), (2) Internet of Energy (IoE), (3) Internet
of Sensors (IoS), and (4) Machine to Machine Communications (M2M).
IEEE 802.15.4 based protocols [12]. The list of acronyms used
in this paper is listed in Acronyms Section.
The vision of the IoT will advance based on many new
features and will cope with new challenges, as shown in
Figure 2, including cloud computing, M2M, IoS, IoE, IoV,
social networks, software defined optical networks (SDONs),
and fifth generation (5G) cellular networks. The IoT data
which will be produced from billions of interactions between
devices and people is going to be not only massive, but also
complex and it will suffer from many security and privacy
problems, especially regarding the authentication among
devices. To resolve these security issues, researchers in the
field of computer security have developed many authentica-
tion protocols applied in the context of the IoT. The aim of
the current survey paper is to provide a comprehensive and
systematic review of recent studies on published authentica-
tion protocols for the IoT in four environments, including,
M2M, IoV, IoE, and IoS. More precisely more than forty
authentication protocols are selected and examined in detail.
The original set of papers was formed from the searchers run
on SCOPUS and Web of Science from the period between
2010 and 2016.The search started on 15/10/2016 and continued
until the submission date of this paper. See Table 1 for a
breakdown of publication dates. The main contributions of
this paper are as follows:
(i) Previous survey articles published in recent years that
deal with the IoT are briefly presented.
(ii) Authentication protocols in M2M, IoV, IoE, and
IoS that were evaluated under thirty-five attacks are
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Figure 2: Vision of the IoT with main features and challenges.
Table 1: Publication date breakdown-surveyed papers (authentica-
tion protocols).
Papers Year
[17–24] 2010
[25–31] 2011
[32–36] 2012
[37–45] 2013
[46–51] 2014
[52–60] 2015
[61–77] 2016
discussed. Main focus is given on five attacks, which
are mostly studied in earlier works, namely, man-
in-the-middle attack, impersonation attack, forging
attack, replay attack, and Sybil attack.
(iii) Various countermeasures and formal security verifi-
cation techniques used by authentication protocols
for the IoT are presented.
(iv) A side-by-side comparison in a tabular form of the
current state-of-the-art of authentication protocols
which are proposed for the IoT viewed from five
different aspects, namely, network model, specific
security goals,main processes, computation complex-
ity, and communication overhead, is given.
(v) Open issues forM2M, IoV, IoE, and IoS are discussed.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2
summarizes the existing survey works on different aspects of
the IoT idea. In Section 3, an overview of threat models in the
IoT is presented. Section 4 presents various countermeasures
and formal security verification techniques. In Section 5, a
taxonomy and comparison of authentication protocols for the
IoT is presented. Finally, open issues and recommendations
for further research are discussed in Section 6 and main
conclusions are drawn in Section 7.
2. Surveys Articles for the IoT
There exist many survey articles published during recent
years that deal with Internet of Things, focusing on different
aspects of the IoT idea, for example, networking, applications,
standardization, social interactions, security, andmanymore.
These survey articles are categorized in terms of field of
research as shown in Table 2. Internet of Things concepts
attracts more and more attention as the years pass by and
although a lot of different areas related to IoT are covered
from previous review works, no survey article exists that
thoroughly investigates authentication protocols that are
especially developed for this new technology or better say
this blend of technologies and systems. In this section we will
briefly present all these survey articles grouped as shown in
Table 2 and will discuss in more depth previous works that
deal with security and privacy issues of the IoT.
The first survey article in the literature that was dealing
with the IoT concept was published back in 2009 by Cooper
and James [14] and focused on the challenges for database
management in the IoT. Seeing the IoT from that point of
view they found that the technical priorities that needed
to be addressed in order to support the interconnection of
every device were proper indexing, archiving, development
of smart agents, the use of XML for achieving Interoperability,
and novel systems that will be able to offer efficient and secure
transaction management. In a later survey article that was
published in 2010, Atzori et al. [6] discussed the vision of
“anytime, anywhere, any media, anything” communications
that the IoT would bring in our everyday lives. Based on
their research author spotted two important technologies
that needed to be applied in order to bring IoT into life,
Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6) and Web 2.0. The same
year, the first survey article that dealt with security and
privacy issues related to IoTwas published [15]. In this article,
Weber discussed the different measures that were needed in
order to ensure the architecture’s resilience to attacks, data
authentication, access control, and client privacy. The article
dealt with security and privacy issues from the legislation
perspective mostly due to the fact that the IoT was more an
idea back in 2010 than a concrete system yet. Another article
dealing with security and privacy was published in 2010 from
Medaglia and Serbanati [16]. The article tried to present a
short term and a long-term vision of the IoT along with the
security issues and solutions that would be needed.
In 2011 several published survey articles focused on the
IoT [83, 87, 89, 93, 104, 126]. In [87] authors conducted a
thorough analysis of the different publicly available testbeds.
Bandyopadhyay and Sen [93] published an interesting survey
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Table 2: Areas of research of each survey article for the IoT.
Ref. DD MW AP SE SP Exp Net ST Arch SR RFID Soc DM IIoT
[14, 78–80] ✓
[6, 81–84] ✓
[6, 85, 86] ✓
[87] ✓
[7, 80, 88–92] ✓
[93–98] ✓
[99–103] ✓
[104] ✓
[15, 16, 89, 90, 94, 105–119] ✓
[120, 121] ✓
[122–125] ✓
[5, 6, 90, 93, 94, 99, 126–134] ✓
[135, 136] ✓
[100] ✓
DD: Data quality and database management, MW: middleware, AP: applications, SE: smart environments, SP: security and privacy, Exp: experimentation,
Net: networking, ST: standardization, Arch: architecture, SR: searching, RFID: RFID technology, Soc: Social Internet of Things, DM: data mining, and IIoT:
industrial Internet of Things.
article about the current developments related to IoT and the
open issues back in 2011. The article managed to spot most of
the challenges that IoT had and still has to face nowadays, for
example, managing large amount of information and mining
large volume of data, managing heterogeneity, and ensuring
security privacy and trust, among others. Feasible solutions
for the problem of establishing a session key between a client
and a server in the context of the Internet of Things were
surveyed in [89], where the authors considered the scenario
where at least one peer was a sensor node. They especially
focused on different cryptography solutions and how these
could be applied to server and client nodes. Ma in [126] gave
an overview of the objectives of the IoT and the challenges
involved in IoT development while in [104] Zhang et al.
covered the topic of how to build an appropriate search engine
for IoT, a topic that was spotted from Cooper and James in
[14] back in 2009 as a challenge to be addressed in the future.
During 2012 and 2013 the following survey articles were
published [5, 82, 94–97, 99, 105, 106, 122, 123] dealing
with standardization, applications, architecture, security, and
privacy issues of the IoT. Articles [95–97] surveyed stan-
dardization issues and how the IETF Constrained RESTful
Environments (CoRE) working group focuses on facilitating
the integration of constrained devices with the Internet at
the service level. These articles pointed out that all the
standardized protocols are only a starting point for exploring
additional open issues like resource representation, security
and privacy, energy efficiency, and so on. Authors in [5, 94]
gave a general overview of the current vision, applications,
architectural elements, and future challenges and directions
of the IoT. Miorandi et al. in [94] discussed the potential
impact of the IoT on smart home automation, smart cities,
environmental monitoring, health care, smart businesses,
and security and surveillance making very clear, maybe for
the first time, that the IoT concept involves every current
or future technology that is going to be introduced in
order to make our life better. Domingo in [99] performed
a more narrow but extensive survey of the IoT for people
with disabilities. Authors spotted the relevant application
scenarios and main benefits along with the key research
challenges, like customization, self-management, and secu-
rity and privacy issues. They argued that as brain–computer
interfaces (BCIs) are becoming commercial, they will also be
a part of the IoT world. Articles [105, 106] focused on security
and privacy issues as they were identified back in 2012 and
2013, respectively. Both articles agree that key management
needs strong legislation, while authors in [106] take one step
further and propose that grouping of the IoT devices and
creating the so called intranet of things could help impose
security mechanisms more effectively. Finally articles [122,
123] survey for the first time the social concept of the IoT, the
so called Social Internet of Things, a concept that later will
raise a lot of attraction and research works.
During 2014 and 2015 more than twenty new survey
articles about IoT were published [7, 85, 98, 100, 102, 107,
108, 110, 112–116, 121, 124, 128–130, 135, 136, 212, 213]. Except
articles that discussed general issues regarding IoT [98, 129,
130, 212], for example, applications, challenges, trends, and
open issues, other papers focused on specific applications or
research areas that are connected to the IoT idea. Authors in
all three articles agree that IoT thus brings new opportunities
by enabling enriched context-aware services, but it also raises
new challenges that need to be addressed. Zanella et al. [85]
focused specifically to an urban IoT system which is another
term to describe the smart city environment. In contrast to
the previous years during 2014 and 2015 a big proportion
of the survey articles focus on security and privacy issues
related to the IoT [107, 108, 110, 112–116], revealing the
significance that security was beginning to have for cyber-
physical systems. Cyber-Physical systems need to rely on IoT
enabled technologies which can be effectively and efficiently
supported and assisted by cloud computing infrastructures
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Figure 3: Classification of attacks in the IoT.
and platforms. The integration of IoT and cloud computing
was thoroughly surveyed from Botta et al. [128] where also
the possibility of exploiting fog computing capabilities for
supporting the IoT concept was discussed. Data mining in
the IoT context was surveyed by Tsai et al. [135] and Chen
et al. [136]. Authors in [135] presented a good summary
of the potentials that applying data mining technologies to
the IoT could have to people, the system itself, and other
interconnected systems. Authors in [136] took a step further
and based on their survey and analysis proposed a big data
mining system for IoT. Ortiz et al. [124] surveyed the Social
Internet ofThings and compared to the earlier survey articles
[122, 123] proposed a generic SIoT architecturewhich consists
of actors, a central intelligent system, an interface, and the
Internet. Two articles focused on IoT-based health care
technologies [121, 213], covering new platforms, applications,
and security and privacy issues that arise. Authors in [100]
conducted an extensive literature review about the current
status and future research opportunities regarding the use of
IoT in industries, the so called Industrial Internet of Things
(IIoT), while in [102] authors tried to identify the impact of
the Internet ofThings (IoT) on Enterprise Systems inmodern
manufacturing.
During 2016 over fifteen new survey articles that focused
on the IoT concept were published [78–80, 84, 86, 91, 103,
111, 117–119, 125, 131, 132, 134, 214]. Following the technology
development three of the articles published this year focused
on the integration of the cloud and the IoT, the applications,
the requirements, and the security issues that arise from it
[117, 131, 134]. Security was also one aspect that was covered
from a number of survey articles [117–119]. Authors in [118]
covered several aspects of IoT security, for example, general
devices security, communication security, network security,
and application, while in [119] mechanisms that reassure
secure routing were investigated. In contrast to previous
years, surveys published during 2016 covered new areas, such
as SDN and virtualization [91], economic and pricing theory
in IoT [80], social Internet of vehicles [125], and data quality
[78]. Other topics covered from the survey articles were
middleware [84], data models [79], mobile crowd sensing
strategies [132], the deployment of IoT in smart environments
[86], and the main proposed architectures for IoT [103]. Xie
et al. [111] surveyed the security of the Web of Things (WoT)
which is aimed to provide any electronic item (smart cards,
sensors, etc.) with a URL.
Among the aforementioned surveys, the security and
privacy issues that are related to the IoT were thoroughly
covered and analyzed [15, 16, 89, 90, 94, 105–119]. As it is
shown in Table 3 data authentication and integrity were
only covered partially from He and Zeadally [121] while the
rest of the articles did not cover this major security aspect.
In this article we tend to survey authentication protocols
for the IoT in four environments, including (1) Machine to
Machine communications (M2M), (2) Internet of Vehicles
(IoV), (3) Internet of Energy (IoE), and (4) Internet of Sensors
(IoS). Based on this thorough analysis open issues and
future directions are identified that combine both innovative
research along with the application, through appropriate
adaptation, of existing solutions from other fields. We believe
that this study will help researchers focus on the important
aspects of authentication issues in the IoT area and will guide
them towards their future research.
3. Threat Models
In this section various threat models in the IoT are discussed.
The summary of thirty-five attacks in M2M, IoV, IoE, and
IoS and defense protocols are given in Tables 4, 5, 6, and
7, respectively. We focus on five attacks, which are mostly
used by authors that propose new authentications protocols
for evaluating their methods, namely, man-in-the-middle
attack, impersonation attack, forging attack, replay attack,
and Sybil attack. Generally, the classification of attacks [215–
218] frequently mentioned in the literature is done using the
following four types, as shown in Figure 3:
(1) Type A: Passive or active;
(2) Type B: Internal or external;
(3) Type C [219]: Key-based attacks, data-based attacks,
impersonation-based attacks, and physical-based
attacks;
(4) Type D [220]: Identity-based attacks, location-based
attacks, eavesdropping-based attacks, manipulation-
based attack, and service-based attacks.
3.1. Man-in-the-Middle Attack. Theman-in-the-middle (MITM)
attack is one of the most well known attacks in the IoT. With
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Table 3: A comparison of related surveys in the literature (surveys on security and privacy for the IoT).
Survey on security and
privacy for the IoT
Privacy
preserving
schemes
Authentication
protocols Comments
Weber (2010) [15] 0 X Presented milestones of an adequate legal frameworkfor IoT privacy
Medaglia and Serbanati
(2010) [16] 0 X
Presented a Short-Term and Long-Term vision for IoT
privacy
Roman et al. (2011) [89] X X
Analyzed some key management systems for sensor
networks in the context of the IoT (public key
cryptography and preshared keys)
Miorandi et al. (2012) [94] 0 X Presented some security challenges in IoT, includingData confidentiality, Privacy, and Trust
Suo et al. (2012) [105] X X
Discussed the security requirements in each level for
IoT (four key levels, i.e., recognition layer, network
layer, support layer, and application layer)
Aggarwal et al. (2013) [90] 0 X Discussed the privacy in data collection, and duringdata transmission and sharing
Roman et al. (2013) [106] X X Presented the security issues in distributed IoT systems
Yan et al. (2014) [107] ✓ X
Surveyed the privacy-preserving schemes IoT,
including database query, scientific computations,
intrusion detection, and data mining
Jing et al. (2014) [108] X X Discussed the security issues and technical solutions inWSNs
Chabridon et al. (2014)
[109] ✓ X
Surveyed the state of the art of privacy technology from
the perspective of the IoT
Ziegeldorf et al. [110] ✓ X Surveyed the privacy threats and challenges in the IoT
Keoh et al. (2014) [112] X X Presented an overview of the efforts in the IETF tostandardize security solutions for the IoT ecosystem
Sicari et al. (2015) [113] 0 X Discussed the privacy, trust, enforcement, securemiddleware, and mobile security in the IoT
Granjal et al. (2015) [114] X 0 Discussed IoT communications and security at thephysical and MAC layers
Sadeghi et al. (2015) [115] X X Discussed an introduction to Industrial IoT systemswith the related security and privacy challenges
Nguyen et al. (2015) [116] 0 X
Surveyed the secure communication protocols for the
IoT, including asymmetric key schemes and symmetric
key predistribution schemes
He and Zeadally (2015)
[121] X 0
Analyzed only the RFID authentication schemes for the
IoT in healthcare environment using elliptic curve
cryptography
Xie et al. (2016) [111] X X Reviewed the security issues for Web of Things
Singh et al. (2016) [117] X X Analyzed the state of cloud-supported IoT to makeexplicit the security considerations
Li et al. (2016) [118] X X Analyzed the security requirements and potentialthreats in a four-layer architecture for the IoT
Airehrour et al. (2016) [119] X X Analyzed the security of routing protocols for the IoT
Our work 0 ✓
Surveyed the authentication protocols for the IoT in
four environments, including (1)Machine to Machine
Communications (M2M), (2) Internet of Vehicles
(IoV), (3) Internet of Energy (IoE), and (4) Internet of
Sensors (IoS)
✓ indicates fully supported; X indicates not supported; 0 indicates partially supported.
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Table 4: Summary of attacks in Machine to Machine Communications (M2M) and defense protocols.
Adversary model Authentication protocols for M2M
[62] [61] [46] [38] [34] [53] [47] [137] [37]
Audio replay attack ✓ 0 X 0 0 0 X X 0
Changing distance attack ✓ X X X X X X X X
Same-type-device attack ✓ X X X X X X X X
Composition attack ✓ X X X X X X X X
Redirection attack 0 ✓ 0 ✓ X X 0 X ✓
Man-in-the-middle attack 0 ✓ 0 ✓ 0 0 X X ✓
Substitution attack 0 0 0 0 0 X X X X
DoS attack X ✓ X ✓ X X ✓ X X
Replay attack 0 X X ✓ 0 ✓ X X ✓
Forging attack X X X 0 X X X X X
Colluding attack 0 X X 0 X X 0 X X
Flooding attack 0 X X X X X 0 X 0
Side-channel attack 0 X X X X X 0 X 0
False messages attack 0 X X X 0 0 0 X 0
Sybil attack X X X X 0 0 X X 0
Movement tracking X X X X 0 X X X 0
Message modification X X X X 0 X X X X
Impersonation attack X X X X 0 ✓ ✓ X X
Guessing attack X X X X X ✓ X X X
Stolen-verifier attack X X X X X ✓ X X X
Wormhole attack 0 0 X 0 X 0 X X 0
Blackhole attack 0 0 X 0 0 0 X X 0
Attribute-trace attack X X X X 0 X X X X
Eavesdropping attack X X X X 0 0 X X 0
Chosen-plaintext attack X X X X 0 X X X 0
Spam attack 0 X X X 0 0 X X 0
Identity theft attack 0 X X X X 0 X X X
User manipulation attack 0 X X X X 0 0 X 0
Routing attack 0 X X X X 0 X X X
Linkability attack 0 X X X X X X X X
Rejection attack X X X X X X X X X
Successive-response attack X X X X X X X X X
Packet analysis attack X 0 X X X 0 X X 0
Packet tracing attack X 0 X X X 0 X X 0
Brute-force attack 0 0 X 0 0 X 0 0 X
✓ indicates fully supported; X indicates not supported; 0 indicates partially supported.
MITM attack, an adversary can spoof the identities of two
honest nodes (N1 and N2) involved in a network exchange
and pass N1 for N2 and vice versa, that is, taking control
of the communication channel between N1 and N2. Under
this control, an adversary can intercept, modify, change, or
replace target victims’ communication traffic. However, we
note here that there is a good survey article published in
2016 by Conti et al. in [13], which presents a comprehensive
survey on MITM attacks. Specifically, authors in [13] classify
MITMattacks in three different categories, namely, (1)MITM
based on impersonation techniques, (2) MITM based on
the communication channel, and (3) MITM based on the
location of an adversary. As presented in Figure 4, at any
moment an adversary can set up a connection between False
BTS and Legitimate MS, where False MS impersonates the
victim’s MS to the real network by resending the identity
information. Moreover, as presented in Table 8, there are
twelve authentication protocols for the IoT, which can detect
and avoid the MITM attack. The four authentication proto-
cols in [61, 75, 77, 146] use the idea of mutual authentication.
The two authentication protocols [37, 38] use the idea of
authentication acknowledgement phase. With the protocol
[139], all packets are fully encrypted with the receiver’s public
key, which can prevent the MITM attack. On the other hand,
with the protocol [39], when the keys generated at the mobile
router and the relay router for authentication are based on
8 Security and Communication Networks
Table 5: Summary of attacks in Internet of Vehicles (IoV) and defense protocols.
Adversary model Authentication protocols for IoV
[39] [40] [63] [64] [65] [66] [48] [52] [54]
Audio replay attack 0 0 0 X 0 0 X 0 X
Changing distance attack X X X X X X X X X
Same-type-device attack X X X X X X X X X
Composition attack X X X X X X X X X
Redirection attack 0 0 X X X X X X X
Man-in-the-middle attack ✓ 0 0 X X ✓ 0 X X
Substitution attack 0 0 0 X X 0 ✓ X X
DoS attack ✓ X X ✓ ✓ ✓ X X X
Replay attack ✓ ✓ ✓ X 0 0 0 ✓ 0
Forging attack 0 ✓ X X X 0 X X X
Colluding attack 0 ✓ X 0 X X X X X
Flooding attack X X X 0 X X X X X
Side-channel attack X X X 0 ✓ X X X X
False messages attack X X X X ✓ X X X 0
Sybil attack 0 X X X ✓ 0 X X 0
Movement tracking X X X X X X X ✓ X
Message modification X X X X X X 0 ✓ X
Impersonation attack X X X X X ✓ X 0 X
Guessing attack X X X X X X X X 0
Stolen-verifier attack X X X X X X X X 0
Wormhole attack 0 0 X X 0 X 0 0 0
Blackhole attack 0 0 X X 0 X 0 0 0
Attribute-trace attack X X X X X 0 X X 0
Eavesdropping attack X X 0 0 0 X X 0 0
Chosen-plaintext attack X X X 0 X X 0 X 0
Spam attack X X X 0 X 0 0 X X
Identity theft attack X X X 0 X X 0 X X
User manipulation attack X X X 0 X X 0 0 X
Routing attack 0 X 0 X 0 X 0 0 0
Linkability attack X X X X X 0 X 0 X
Rejection attack X X X X X 0 X 0 0
Successive-response attack X X X X X 0 X X X
Packet analysis attack 0 0 X X 0 0 X 0 0
Packet tracing attack 0 0 X X 0 0 X 0 0
Brute-force attack X X X X X 0 X 0 0
✓ indicates fully supported; X: indicates not supported; 0: indicates partially supported.
the concept of symmetric polynomials, an adversary can not
identify a shared key between two legitimate users making
it impossible for him to impersonate a mobile router or a
relay router. In addition, both protocols [72, 142] are based on
a password and biometric update phase in order to prevent
an adversary from impersonating the passwords of a smart
meter.
3.2. Impersonation and Forging Attack. Under the imper-
sonation and forging attack in the IoS, an adversary can
eavesdrop or intercept the login request message of previous
sessions over the public/open channel during authentication
protocol execution. After that, he can modify and retransmit
the message to the user in order to impersonate as a valid
user, as defined by Amin and Biswas [70] and shown in
the Figure 5. We note that this attack is analyzed more in
authentication protocols that are produced for the IoS. More-
over, as presented in Table 9 there are sixteen authentication
protocols for the IoT, which can detect the impersonation and
forging attack. The protocol [40] uses two ideas, namely, (1)
linear search algorithm and (2) binary search algorithm. The
protocol [47] uses strong anonymous access authentication
and user tracking on a disputed access request, to prevent
the impersonation and forging attack. Besides, the idea of
using a password for detecting the impersonation of the
gateway node is presented by four authentication protocols
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Table 6: Summary of attacks in Internet of Energy (IoE) and defense protocols.
Adversary model Authentication protocols for IoE
[28] [49] [138] [139] [140] [141] [142] [55] [67]
Audio replay attack X X X X X X X X X
Changing distance attack 0 X X X X 0 0 0 X
Same-type-device attack X X X 0 X X X X X
Composition attack X X X X X X X X X
Redirection attack X X X 0 X 0 X X X
Man-in-the-middle attack 0 0 0 ✓ 0 0 ✓ 0 0
Substitution attack X 0 X X X X 0 0 X
DoS attack X X 0 ✓ X 0 ✓ X 0
Replay attack 0 ✓ 0 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 0 ✓
Forging attack ✓ 0 0 0 0 X X X X
Colluding attack X 0 X 0 0 X 0 0 X
Flooding attack X 0 X 0 X X 0 0 0
Side-channel attack X X X X X 0 0 0 X
False messages attack 0 ✓ 0 0 0 0 0 0 ✓
Sybil attack 0 0 0 0 0 0 X X 0
Movement tracking 0 X X X X 0 X X 0
Message modification 0 ✓ 0 0 0 0 0 0 ✓
Impersonation attack 0 0 X X 0 X 0 0 0
Guessing attack X 0 X 0 X X X X X
Stolen-verifier attack X X X X X X X X X
Wormhole attack X X 0 X X 0 0 0 0
Blackhole attack X X 0 X X 0 0 0 0
Attribute-trace attack X X X 0 X 0 X X X
Eavesdropping attack 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Chosen-plaintext attack X X X 0 X ✓ X X X
Spam attack X X X 0 X X X X X
Identity theft attack X X 0 0 0 X 0 0 0
User manipulation attack X X X X 0 X X X 0
Routing attack X X 0 0 X X X X X
Linkability attack 0 X 0 0 X X 0 0 X
Rejection attack 0 X 0 0 0 X 0 0 0
Successive-response attack 0 X X 0 X X X X 0
Packet analysis attack 0 ✓ 0 0 0 X 0 0 ✓
Packet tracing attack 0 0 X 0 0 0 0 0 0
Brute-force attack X X X ✓ X X ✓ 0 X
✓ indicates fully supported; X indicates not supported; 0 indicates partially supported.
[53, 77, 147, 148]. In addition, the hash mechanism which is
applied on the shared key between gateway wireless node and
sensors can prevent the impersonation of a sensor.
3.3. Replay Attack. The replay attacks are MITM attacks,
which consist of intercepting data packets and retransmitting
them as is (without any decryption) to the destination server,
as shown in Figure 6 (intercepting D3 and retransmitting it).
Under this attack, an adversary can obtain the same rights
as the user. A wormhole attack can be launched through the
replay attack as shown in Figure 7. However, there are twenty-
four authentication protocols for the IoT, which can detect
and avoid the replay attack, as presented in Table 10. These
authentication protocols use three ideas, namely, Timestamp,
Hash function, and random numbers. The idea of random
numbers is used by [37–39, 53]. The idea of hash function is
used by protocols [49, 143], such as the IPSec protocol which
implements an antireplay mechanism based on message
authentication code (MAC) [221]. In addition, the idea of
Timestamp in the encrypted messages is used by [40, 49, 52,
63, 67, 68, 70, 72, 73, 75–77, 139–144, 148].
3.4. Sybil Attack. With the Sybil attack, a malicious node
can claim different identities in order to gain an advantage
over legitimate nodes, as shown in Figure 8. Based on the
member secrets generation stage, Zhang et al. [65] proposed
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Table 7: Summary of attacks in Internet of Sensors (IoS) and defense protocols.
Adversary model Authentication protocols for IoS
[68] [69] [143] [70] [71] [72] [73] [74] [75] [144] [76] [145] [77] [146] [147] [148]
Audio replay attack X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Changing distance attack 0 X 0 X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Same-type-device attack 0 X 0 X X X X X 0 X X X X X X X
Composition attack ✓ 0 X X 0 0 X 0 0 X X X 0 0 0 0
Redirection attack ✓ 0 0 0 X 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Man-in-the-middle attack 0 0 0 0 0 ✓ 0 0 ✓ 0 0 0 ✓ ✓ ✓ 0
Substitution attack 0 X X X X X 0 X 0 0 0 0 0 X X X
DoS attack 0 0 0 X 0 X 0 X ✓ 0 0 X 0 0 0 0
Replay attack ✓ 0 ✓ ✓ 0 ✓ ✓ 0 ✓ ✓ ✓ X ✓ 0 0 ✓
Forging attack 0 ✓ 0 X 0 ✓ 0 0 0 0 0 X 0 ✓ ✓ 0
Colluding attack 0 0 0 X 0 0 0 X 0 0 0 ✓ 0 0 0 0
Flooding attack ✓ 0 X X 0 0 0 X 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Side-channel attack X 0 X X X X X X X X X X 0 X X X
False messages attack 0 X 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sybil attack 0 0 ✓ 0 X X X 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Movement tracking 0 0 X X 0 X X 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Message modification 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ✓ 0 0 0 0 ✓ 0 0 0
Impersonation attack ✓ ✓ 0 ✓ ✓ 0 0 ✓ 0 ✓ ✓ X ✓ 0 0 ✓
Guessing attack ✓ ✓ 0 ✓ 0 0 0 0 0 ✓ ✓ X ✓ 0 ✓ 0
Stolen-verifier attack ✓ X X 0 0 X X X ✓ 0 0 0 ✓ 0 0 0
Wormhole attack 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X X X X X 0 X X X
Blackhole attack 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X X X X X 0 X X X
Attribute-trace attack X X X X X 0 X X 0 X X X 0 X X X
Eavesdropping attack 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Chosen-plaintext attack X X X X X X X X X X X X X 0 0 0
Spam attack X X X 0 X X 0 X 0 X X X X 0 0 0
Identity theft attack 0 0 0 X X X 0 X 0 X X X 0 0 0 0
User manipulation attack 0 0 X 0 0 X 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Routing attack 0 0 0 0 0 X 0 X 0 X X X 0 X X X
Linkability attack 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X 0 X X X 0 X X X
Rejection attack 0 0 0 0 0 X 0 X 0 X X X 0 X X X
Successive-response attack ✓ X 0 X 0 X X X 0 X X X X X X X
Packet analysis attack 0 0 X 0 0 X X ✓ X X X X X 0 0 0
Packet tracing attack 0 0 X 0 ✓ X X ✓ X X X X X 0 0 0
Brute-force attack X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
✓ indicates fully supported; X indicates not supported; 0 indicates partially supported.
a distributed aggregate privacy-preserving authentication
protocol, called DAPPA, which is robust and resilient to the
Sybil attacks in the IoV environment. Using a token-based
authentication approach, Jan et al. [143] proposed a payload-
based mutual authentication protocol, called PAWN in the
IoS environment. PAWNcan detect the Sybil attacks based on
the cluster formation between neighboring nodes and their
nearest cluster head.
4. Countermeasures and Formal Security
Verification Techniques
In order to satisfy the authentication model to secure
IoT, namely, mutual authentication, perfect forward secrecy,
anonymity, and untraceability, the authentication protocols
use both cryptosystems and non-cryptosystems countermea-
sures. Tables 11, 12, 13, and 14 present the cryptosystems
and countermeasures used in authentication protocols for
M2M, IoV, IoE, and IoS, respectively. In this section, we will
discuss the countermeasures and present the formal security
verification techniques used in these authentication protocols
for the IoT.
4.1. Countermeasures. Based on the cryptosystems, the exist-
ing authentication protocols for the IoT can mainly be clas-
sified into three categories: symmetric-cryptosystem based,
asymmetric-cryptosystem-based, and hybrid protocols, as
shown in Figure 9. As presented in the following (Tables 11,
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Table 8: Approaches for detecting and avoiding the man-in-the-middle attack.
Protocol Data attacked Approach
Lai et al. (2016) [61] Communication channel between the mobilemanagement entity and the home subscriber server
Mutual authentication and key agreement
between multiple M2M devices and the
core network simultaneously
Lai et al. (2013) [38] The data between the mobiles equipment’s and the3GPP network Authentication acknowledge phase
Cespedes et al. (2013) [39] (i) Identify a shared key between two legitimate users(ii) Impersonate a mobile router or a relay router
The keys generated at the mobile router
and the relay router for authentication are
based on the concept of symmetric
polynomials
Dolev et al. (2016) [66] Communication channel between the vehicles (i) Twofold authentication(ii) Periodic certificate restore
Nicanfar et al. (2011) [139]
(i) Communication channel between the smart meter
and the authentication agent
(ii) Communication channel between the
authentication agent and the security associate (SA)
server
All packets are fully encrypted with the
receivers public key
Nicanfar et al. (2014) [142] The passwords of smart meter Changing the server password more often
Das (2016) [72] The login request message during the login phase Password and biometric update phase
Lai et al. (2013) [37] Can occur while connecting to a base station Authentication acknowledge phase
Farash et al. (2016) [75] Data between the sensor node, users, and gateway node Mutual authentication
Jiang et al. (2017) [77] Data between the Sensor node, users and Gateway node Mutual authentication
Wu et al. (2016) [146] Data between the Sensor node, users and Gateway node Mutual authentication
Das et al. (2016) [147] The lost/stolen smart card of a legal user Password change phase
Attacker’s Network
False BTS
False MS
False MS
Legitimate MS
Legitimate BTS
Legitimate Network
Figure 4: MITM attack on GSM as defined by Conti et al. in [13],
BTS: Base Transceiver Station; MS: Mobile Station.
12, 13, and 14), most authentication protocols use a secure
cryptographic hash function [149].
As presented in Table 11, the protocol [137] uses three
cryptosystems, namely, original data acquisition, spatial-
domain transformation, and time-domain transformation.
The protocol [62] use two matching algorithms, namely,
correlation coefficient-based matching algorithm (C-MA)
and deviation ratio-based matching algorithm (D-MA). The
aggregate message authentication codes (AMACs) [150] are
used by both schemes [37, 61].TheAMAC tool is a tuple of the
following probabilistic polynomial time algorithms: Authen-
tication algorithm, Aggregation algorithm, and Verification
algorithm. The authentication algorithm outputs a 𝑡𝑎𝑔 tag,
where the aggregate of tags can be simply computing the XOR
of all the tag values; that is, 𝑡𝑎𝑔 = 𝑡𝑎𝑔1⊕𝑡𝑎𝑔2⊕⋅ ⋅ ⋅⊕𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑙, where
1, . . . , 𝑙 are identifiers. The protocol [46] uses certificateless
aggregate signature [151], which enables an algorithm to
aggregate 𝑛 signatures of 𝑛 distinctmessages from 𝑛 users into
a single short signature. In addition, the certificateless aggre-
gate signature scheme is secure against existential forgery in
the chosen aggregate model. The aggregate signature genera-
tor computes 𝑉 = ∑𝑛𝑖=1 𝑉𝑖 and outputs 𝜎𝑛 = (𝑈1, . . . , 𝑈𝑛, 𝑉)
as an aggregate signature. The protocol [38] uses Elliptic
Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) [152], which is an anonymous
key agreement protocol. The protocol [34] uses ID-based
signature scheme [153] that consists of four algorithms, Setup,
Extract, Sign, and Verify. With Setup algorithm, the trust
authority chooses efficiently computable monomorphisms.
The trust authority performs the Extract algorithm when a
signer requests the secret key corresponding to their identity.
The 𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛 algorithm produces a signature from the user with
identity 𝐼𝐷 on the message 𝑚. Therefore, the protocol [53]
uses advanced encryption standard (AES) [154], which is a
symmetric encryption standard intended to replace the Data
Encryption Standard (DES) [222] that has become too weak
in view of current attacks. The protocol [47] uses the Linear
Combination Encryption (LCE) [155], which is an extension
of ElGamal encryption [223] that is secure in groups where
the Decision Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem is easy but the
Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem is hard.With
the LCE scheme [155], a user’s public and secret keys are
defined as 𝑝𝑘 = (𝑢, V, 𝑤1 = 𝑢
𝑥, 𝑤2 = V
𝑦) and 𝑠𝑘 = (𝑥, 𝑦),
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Table 9: Approaches for detecting and avoiding the impersonation and forging attack.
Protocol Data attacked Approach
Wasef and Shen (2013) [40] Forge the revocation check (i) Linear search algorithm(ii) Binary search algorithm
Chung et al. (2016) [69] Impersonate the mobile node Login and authentication phase
Das (2016) [72] Eavesdrop or intercept the login request message of theprevious sessions Authentication and key agreement phase
Wu et al. (2016) [146] The data produced by the smart card in the Login phase Elliptic curve cryptosystem
Das et al. (2016) [147] Eavesdrop, modify, or delete the contents of thetransmitted messages Password and biometric update
Sun et al. (2015) [53] Information leakage of the M2M server The authentication process based onpassword
Lai et al. (2014) [47] Forge and/or modify the authentication messages
(i) Strong anonymous access
authentication
(ii) User tracking on a disputed access
request
Dolev et al. (2016) [66] Forge and/or modify the authentication messages Two rounds of session key
Kumari et al. (2016) [68] Impersonation of user and sensor node
Gateway wireless node does not maintain
any record to store user-specific
information
Amin and Biswas (2016)
[70] Intercepts the login request message Authentication and key agreement
Gope and Hwang (2016)
[71] The server’s secret key
Adversary has no knowledge about the
secret identity of the gateway
Jiang et al. (2016) [74] Gets the user smart card
The hash mechanism using the shared
key between gateway wireless node and
sensor
Srinivas et al. (2017) [144] Impersonation of the gateway node Noninvertible cryptographic one wayhash function property
Kumari et al. (2016) [76] Impersonation of the gateway node Secret session key
Jiang et al. (2017) [77] Gets the user smart card Password
Liu and Chung (2016) [148] Intercepts the login request message Password
False MS
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Figure 5: Impersonation attack, MS: Mobile Station.
where 𝑢, V← 𝐺1 and𝑥, 𝑦 ← 𝑍
∗
𝑝.Themessage𝑀 is encrypted
to (𝐷1 = 𝑢
𝑎, 𝐷2 = V
𝑏, 𝐷3 = 𝑀 ⋅ 𝑤
𝑎
1𝑤
𝑏
2) where 𝑎, 𝑏 ∈ 𝑍
∗
𝑝 are
random.Then, the original message𝑀 is decrypted from the
ciphertext (𝐷1, 𝐷2, 𝐷3) by𝐷3 ⋅ (𝐷
𝑥
1 ⋅ 𝐷
𝑦
2 )
−1.
As presented in Table 12, the protocol [39] uses both
countermeasures, namely, Proxy Mobile IP (PMIP) [156]
and Symmetric Polynomials [157]. The PMIP is a localized
network based IP mobility protocol (RFC 5213 [224]) that
defines two entities: the Mobile Access Gateway (MAG)
and the Local Mobility Anchor (LMA). The symmetric
polynomial is defined as any polynomial of two or more
variables that achieves the interchangeability property, that
is,𝑓(𝑥, 𝑦) = 𝑓(𝑦, 𝑥). For example, given two users identities 1
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Table 10: Approaches for detecting and avoiding the replay attack.
Protocol Data attacked Approach
Lai et al. (2013) [38] Replaying the data between the mobiles equipment and the 3GPPnetwork Random numbers
Sun et al. (2015) [53] Replaying the intercepted login message Random numbers
Lai et al. (2013) [37] Replaying the message between serving gateway and home subscriberserver Random numbers
Cespedes et al. (2013) [39] Replaying one of the router solicitation messages Random numbers
Wasef and Shen (2013) [40] Replaying the disseminated messages in IoV Timestamp
Shao et al. (2016) [63] Replaying the disseminated messages in IoV Timestamp
Zhang et al. (2016) [52] Replaying the disseminated messages in IoV Timestamp
Li et al. (2014) [49] Replaying the electricity consumption reports Merkle hash tree technique
Nicanfar et al. (2011) [139] Replaying the electricity consumption reports Timestamp
Chim et al. (2011) [140] Replaying the electricity consumption reports Timestamp
Fouda et al. (2011) [141] Replaying the electricity consumption reports Timestamp
Nicanfar et al. (2014) [142] Forwarding a previous acknowledgment from the smart meter to theserver Timestamp
Mahmood et al. (2016) [67] Intercept messages by home area network and replay those archaicmessages to building area network gateway Timestamp
Kumari et al. (2016) [68] Intercept and replay the login request to gateway wireless node Timestamp
Jan et al. (2016) [143] Eavesdrop on advertisement packets and/or join-request packets andreplay in other parts of the network Hash function and ring keys
Amin and Biswas (2016) [70] Replaying the message in the IoS Timestamp
Das (2016) [72] Replaying the login request message Timestamp
Chang and Le (2016) [73] Replaying the login request message Timestamp
Farash et al. (2016) [75] Replaying the login request message Timestamp
Srinivas et al. (2017) [144] Replaying the messages in the IoS Timestamp
Kumari et al. (2016) [76] Intercept and replay the login request to gateway wireless node Timestamp
Jiang et al. (2017) [77] Intercept the login request Timestamp
Liu and Chung [148] Intercept the login request Timestamp
False MS
Legitimate MSLegitimate MS
D1 D2 D3
D
3
Figure 6: Replay attack, MS: Mobile Station.
and 2, and the symmetric polynomial𝑓(𝑥, 𝑦) = 𝑥2𝑦2+𝑥𝑦+10,
the resultant evaluation functions are𝑓(1, 𝑦) = 𝑦2+𝑦+10 and
𝑓(2, 𝑦) = 4𝑦2 + 2𝑦 + 10, respectively. Then, if user 1 evaluates
its function 𝑓(1, 𝑦) for user 2, it obtains 𝑓(1, 2) = 16. In the
same way, 𝑓(2, 𝑦) for user 1, user 2 obtains 𝑓(1, 2) = 16. As a
result, both users share a secret key, 16, without transmitting
False MS
MS
Normal link
Wormhole tunnel
Figure 7: Wormhole attack.
any additional messages to each other. Contrary to this idea
of symmetric polynomials, the protocol [40] uses the idea of
search algorithms [158], which include nonoptimized search
algorithms, such as linear search algorithm, and optimized
search algorithms such as binary search algorithm, and
lookup hash tables. In another work [159] Chaum and van
Heyst introduce the idea of group signatures in order to
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Figure 8: Sybil attack, MS: Mobile Station.
provide anonymity for signers. The protocol [63] uses this
idea based on the Strong Diffie-Hellman assumption and
the Decision Linear assumption. The protocol [64] uses
three countermeasures, namely, (1)Merkle Hash Tree (MHT)
[161], (2) TESLA scheme [162], and (3) Elliptic Curve Digital
Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) [163]. The MHT is a binary
tree structure where each leaf is assigned a hash value and
an inner node is assigned the hash value of its children. To
achieve source authentication, the TESLA scheme uses one-
way hash chains with the delayed disclosure of keys based
on symmetric cryptography. The protocol [65] uses multi-
plicative secret sharing technique [164] where the user can
generate one-time pseudonym private key pairs and leakage-
resilient locally. Similar to the protocol [63], the protocol [66]
uses the idea of digital signatures [167].The protocol [48] uses
keyed-hashing for message authentication (HMAC) [169]
to instantiate the pseudorandom function in the prototype
implementation of electric vehicle ecosystem. The protocol
[52] uses two similar ideas, namely, identity-based public key
cryptosystem [165] and identity-based aggregate signature
[166]. For providing a flexible attribute management, the
protocol [54] uses an anonymous attribute-based group setup
scheme [168] that incorporates the policy-based data access
control in the ciphertext.
As presented in Table 13, the protocol [28] uses two
types of verification, namely, Heavy signing light verifica-
tion (HSLV) and Light signing heavy verification (LSHV),
which is based on the HORS scheme [170]. The HSLV
uses the following three algorithms: Key Generation, Signing,
and Verification. The Key Generation algorithm outputs the
public key 𝑃𝐾 = (𝑘, V1, V2, . . . , V𝑡) and the secret key
𝑆𝐾 = (𝑘, 𝑠1, 𝑠2, . . . , 𝑠𝑡) where the trusted authority gen-
erates 𝑡 random 𝑙-bit strings 𝑠1, 𝑠2, . . . , 𝑠𝑡. The signature is
(𝑐, (𝑠𝑖1, 𝑠𝑖2, . . . , 𝑠𝑘)) generated by the Signing algorithm. To
verify a signature (𝑐󸀠, (𝑠󸀠𝑖1, 𝑠
󸀠
𝑖2, . . . , 𝑠
󸀠
𝑘)) over message 𝑚, the
user check if the output integers 𝑖1 > 𝑖2 > 𝑖𝑘 and
𝑓(𝑠󸀠𝑗) = V𝑖𝑗 hold.On the other hand,with LSHV, the signature
verification process verifies the 𝑘 elements of a signature by
applying the one-way function for a distinct number of times
over each element. Similar to the protocol [64], the protocol
[49] uses the same idea of Merkle Hash tree technique [171].
In order to increase the level of security, the protocol [138]
uses three cryptosystems, namely, short signatures (BLS)
[172], batch verification [173], and signature aggregation
[174]. The BLS is introduced by Boneh-Lynn-Shacham [172],
which is based on Gap Diffie-Hellman groups. Specifically,
the BLS scheme uses the following three algorithms: (1) Key
generation algorithm to output the public key V ∈ 𝐺2 and
the private key 𝑥, where 𝑥 ← 𝑍𝑝 and V ← 𝑔2
𝑥; (2) Signing
algorithm to generate a signature 𝜎 ∈ 𝐺1, where 𝜎 ← ℎ
𝑥 and
ℎ ← 𝐻(𝑀) ∈ 𝐺1; and (3)Verification algorithm to verify that
(𝑔2, V, ℎ, 𝜎) is a valid co-Diffie-Hellman tuple. The author of
short signatures (BLS) [172], that is, Boneh et al., proposes
the idea of signature aggregation [174], where an aggregate
signature is valid only if it is an aggregation of signatures on
distinct messages. Similar to the protocol [39], the protocol
[139] uses the same cryptosystem, that is, identity-based
public key cryptosystem [165]. Therefore, both protocols [55,
140] use the two same cryptosystems, namely, (1) the public
key encryption, such as RSA [175], and (2) HMAC, such as
SHA-1 [176] andMD5 [177].Theprotocol [141] uses theDiffie-
Hellman key establishment protocol [178] in order to provide
forward secrecy in Transport Layer Security’s ephemeral
modes. The protocol [142] uses the EIBC mechanism [179],
which is based on the originalmodel developed by Boneh and
Franklin. In addition, the protocol [55] uses the Homomor-
phic Encryption [181] and theBloomFilter [182].Theprotocol
[67] uses two cryptosystems, (1) HMAC, such as SHA-1 [176]
and MD5 [177], and (2) a symmetric encryption/decryption
algorithm [178]. As presented in Table 14, the protocol [68]
uses two countermeasures, namely, Chebyshev ChaoticMaps
[183] and Semigroup Property of Chebyshev Polynomials
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Table 11: Cryptosystems and Countermeasures used in authentication protocols for Machine to Machine Communications (M2M).
Cryptosystems and countermeasures Authentication protocols for M2M
[62] [61] [46] [38] [34] [53] [47] [137] [37]
Secure cryptographic hash function [149] ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Original data acquisition ✓
Spatial-Domain transformation ✓
Time-domain transformation ✓
Correlation coefficient-based matching algorithm (C-MA) ✓
Deviation ratio-based matching algorithm (D-MA) ✓
Aggregate message authentication codes (AMACs) [150] ✓ ✓
Certificateless aggregate signature [151] ✓
Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) [152] ✓
ID-based signature scheme [153] ✓
Advanced encryption standard (AES) [154] ✓
Hybrid Linear Combination Encryption [155] ✓
Table 12: Cryptosystems and countermeasures used in Authentication protocols for Internet of Vehicles (IoV).
Cryptosystems and countermeasures Authentication protocols for IoV
[39] [40] [63] [64] [65] [66] [48] [52] [54]
Secure cryptographic hash function [149] ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Proxy Mobile IP (PMIP) [156] ✓
Symmetric polynomials [157] ✓
Search algorithms [158] ✓
Group signature [159, 160] ✓
Merkle hash tree (MHT) [161] ✓
TESLA scheme [162] ✓
ECDSA signature [163] ✓
Multiplicative secret sharing technique [164] ✓
Identity-based public key cryptosystem [165] ✓
Identity-based aggregate signature [166] ✓
Digital signatures [167] ✓
Anonymous attribute-based group setup scheme [168] ✓
Keyed-hashing for message authentication (HMAC) [169] ✓
Table 13: Cryptosystems and countermeasures used in authentication protocols for Internet of Energy (IoE).
Cryptosystems and countermeasures Authentication protocols for IoE
[28] [49] [138] [139] [140] [141] [142] [55] [67]
Secure cryptographic hash function [149] ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
HORS scheme [170] ✓
Heavy signing light verification (HSLV) [170] ✓
Light signing heavy verification (LSHV) [170] ✓
Merkle Hash tree technique [171] ✓
Short signatures (BLS) [172] ✓
Batch verification [173] ✓
Signature aggregation [174] ✓
Identity-based public key cryptosystem [165] ✓
Public-key encryption, such as RSA [175] ✓ ✓
HMAC, such as SHA-1 [176] and MD5 [177] ✓ ✓ ✓
Diffie-Hellman key establishment protocol [178] ✓
EIBC mechanism [179] ✓
ID-based cryptography (IBC) [180] ✓
Digital signatures [167] ✓
Homomorphic encryption [181] ✓
Bloom filter [182] ✓
Commitment scheme ✓
Symmetric encryption/decryption algorithm [178] ✓
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Table 14: Cryptosystems and countermeasures used in authentication protocols for Internet of Sensors (IoS).
Cryptosystems and countermeasures Authentication protocols for IoS
[68] [69] [143] [70] [71] [72] [73] [74] [75] [144] [76] [145] [77] [146]
Secure cryptographic hash function [149] ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Chebyshev chaotic maps [183] ✓
Chebyshev polynomials [184] ✓
ID-based cryptography (IBC) [180] ✓ ✓ ✓
Advanced encryption standard (AES) [185] ✓
Biometric ✓
Password ✓ ✓ ✓
Smart card ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Fuzzy extractor technique [186] ✓ ✓
Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) [152] ✓ ✓
Key agreement ✓ ✓ ✓
Biohashing [187] ✓
Access polynomial [188] ✓
Elliptic curve cryptography [189] ✓ ✓
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Figure 9: Classification of the existing authentication protocols for the IoT based on the cryptosystems.
[184]. The Chebyshev Polynomial of degree 𝑝 is defined by
Mason and Handscomb [183] as 𝑇𝑝(𝑥) = cos(𝑝𝑋 acrcos𝑥)
where the domain is the interval 𝑥 ∈ [−1, 1] with two
properties [225]. However, three protocols, that is, [69–71],
use the ID-based cryptography (IBC) [180]. On the other
hand, the protocol [143] uses the Advanced Encryption
Standard (AES) [185] such as the protocol [53]. The smart
card-based authentication protocols are a very promising
and practical solution to remote authentication [226], as
presented in Table 15. There are five [72–75, 144] smart
card-based authentication protocols where each protocol
integrates a method with the smart card. For example, the
protocol [72] uses the fuzzy extractor technique [186], where
a fuzzy extractor is a pair of randomized procedures, “gener-
ate” (Gen) and “reproduce” (Rep), and is efficient if Gen and
Rep run in expected polynomial time. For more details about
the fuzzy extractor technique, we refer the reader to the paper
[186]. In addition, the elliptic curve cryptography [189] is used
by both protocols [77, 146].
4.2. Formal Security Verification Techniques. In order to
prove the performance of an authentication protocol in
terms of security, researchers use formal security verifica-
tion techniques. As presented in Figure 10, there are five
formal security verification techniques, namely, BAN-logic,
analysis by process (Spi calculus), Game Theory, Automated
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Table 15: The smart card-based authentication protocols.
Protocol Type Design goal
Das (2016) [72] Remote authentication Providing a user authentication to resolve the securityweaknesses of the scheme [190]
Chang and Le (2016) [73] Remote authentication Providing mutual authentication and perfect forward secrecy
Jiang et al. (2016) [74] Remote authentication Providing mutual authentication, anonymity, and untraceability
Farash et al. (2016) [75] Remote authentication Providing the user authentication with traceability protectionand sensor node anonymity
Srinivas et al. (2017) [144] Remote authentication Providing the mutual authentication with anonymity andunlinkability
BAN-logic
Analysis by
process
(Spi calculus)
Game
eory
Formal security
veriﬁcation technique
Automated
Automated
reasoning
(ProVerif)
Validation
(AVISPA)
Figure 10: Formal security verification techniques used by the
surveyed protocols.
reasoning (ProVerif), and Automated Validation (AVISPA).
In addition, Table 16 presents the formal security verification
techniques used in authentication protocols for the IoT.
The Burrows-Abadi-Needham Logic (BAN-logic) [195] is
used by nine authentication protocols [68–70, 74–77, 144,
147]. A typical BAN-logic sequence includes three steps, (1)
verification of message origin; (2) verification of message
freshness; and (3) verification of the origin’s trustworthiness.
Therefore, the protocol [68] uses the BAN-logic to prove that
the proposed protocol can establish a session key between
user and sensor node. Both protocols [69, 77] use the BAN-
logic in order to prove that the protocol has achieved mutual
authentication and session key agreement securely. The pro-
tocol [144] uses the BAN-logic to prove that the protocol can
resist numerous security attacks, which include the attacks,
found in the Amin and Biswas’s scheme [70]. There are
seven authentication protocols [70, 72, 75, 142, 144, 147,
197] that use the Automated Validation of Internet Security
Protocols and Application (AVISPA) security analyzer [194].
The AVISPA tool provides a modular and expressive formal
language for specifying security protocols and properties.
The protocol [197] uses the AVISPA tool in order to prove
that the proposed protocol is free from man-in-the-middle
and replay attacks. The protocol [75] uses the AVISPA tool
to prove that the protocol allows a user to establish a
session key with a sensor node of his choice near the end
of the authentication process. In addition, there are four
authentication protocols [37, 38, 67, 146] that use the ProVerif
tool [191], which is an automatic cryptographic protocol
verifier, in the formal model, called Dolev-Yao model [196].
The protocol [38] uses the ProVerif tool in order to proof the
mutual authentication between the mobile equipment and
its serving network. The protocol [37] uses the ProVerif tool
to prove that the proposed protocol can implement mutual
authentication and key agreement between multiple devices
and the core network simultaneously.The protocol [146] uses
the ProVerif tool to prove that the proposed protocol can
pass the verifications according to theDolev-Yaomodel [196].
Finally, the protocol [73] uses a sequence of games under
the decisional Diffie-Hellman (ECDDH) problem in order to
proof that the protocol provides secure and perfect forward
secrecy authentication. For more details about the game-
theoretic approaches, we refer the reader to the survey [227].
5. Taxonomy and Comparison of
Authentication Protocols for the IoT
In this section, we examine, in detail, authentication proto-
cols developed for or applied in the context of IoT. As shown
in Figure 11, the realization processes of an authentication
protocol for IoT are based on the following processes:
(1) Definition of network model (e.g., M2M, IoV, IoE,
and IoS).
(2) Definition of authentication model (e.g., mutual
authentication, perfect forward secrecy, anonymity,
and untraceability).
(3) Definition of attacks model (e.g., replay attack, stolen
smart card attack, privileged-insider attack, offline
password guessing attack, impersonation attack, and
sensor node capture attack).
(4) Selection of countermeasures (e.g., cryptographic
methods, Bloom Filter, biometric, Smart card, access
polynomial, and Chebyshev Chaotic Maps).
(5) Proposition of main phases of the protocol (e.g.,
initial setup; registration process).
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Table 16: Formal security verification techniques used in authentication protocols for the IoT.
Protocol Approach Main results
Lai et al. (2013) [38] The security of the protocol is analyzedusing the ProVerif tool [191]
Proof the mutual authentication between mobile
equipment and its serving network
Shao et al. (2016) [63]
(i) Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH)
Assumption;
(ii) Decision Linear (DLIN) Assumption;
(iii) Extended Computational
Diffie-Hellman (eCDH) Assumption
(iv) Computational Inverse
Diffie-Hellman (ciCDH) Assumption
(i) The proposed group signature scheme satisfies
unforgeability
(ii) The proposed group signature scheme satisfies
anonymity
(iii) The proposed theorem satisfies the traceability
Zhang et al. (2016) [65] Based on the size of the beacon intervaland the network bandwidth
Broadcasting the MAC of a message’s prediction outcome
is secure
Zhang et al. (2016) [52]
Bilinear Diffie-Hellman and the
computational Diffie- Hellman
assumptions
The protocol satisfies individual authentication,
non-repudiation, vehicle privacy and traceability
Dolev et al. (2016) [66] Spi calculus [192] The proposed session key establishment protocol respectsthe authenticity property and the secrecy property
Chan and Zhou (2014)
[48] NXP-ATOP platform [193]
Demonstrate the two-factor cyber-physical device
authentication
Lai et al. (2013) [37] The security of the protocol is analyzedusing the ProVerif tool [191]
The scheme can implement mutual authentication and key
agreement between multiple devices and the core network
simultaneously
Li and Cao (2011) [28] Prove the existence of a pivot rank bycontradiction The total signing cost does not increase
Li et al. (2012) [138] Diagnose tools Detect failure points and to minimize the whole fault time
Nicanfar et al. (2014)
[142]
Automated Validation of Internet
Security Protocols and Application
(AVISPA) security analyzer [194]
Providing mutual authentication and key management
mechanisms
Mahmood et al. (2016)
[67]
The security of the protocol is analyzed
using the ProVerif tool [191]
Verifies mutual authentication and session key secrecy
properties of the proposed scheme
Kumari et al. (2016) [68] Burrows-Abadi-Needham Logic(BAN-logic) [195]
Prove that the proposed scheme establishes a session key
between user and sensor node
Chung et al. (2016) [69] Burrows-Abadi-Needham Logic(BAN-logic) [195]
Prove the validity of authentication and key agreement
protocol
Amin and Biswas (2016)
[70]
(i) Burrows-Abadi-Needham Logic
(BAN-logic) [195].
(ii) Automated Validation of Internet
Security Protocols and Application
(AVISPA) security analyzer [194]
Prove that the protocol has achieved mutual
authentication and session key agreement securely
Das (2016) [72]
Automated Validation of Internet
Security Protocols and Application
(AVISPA) security analyzer [194]
The scheme is secure against the replay and
man-in-the-middle attacks against an adversary
Chang and Le (2016) [73] Sequence of games under the decisionalDiffie-Hellman (ECDDH) problem
The scheme provides secure and perfect forward secrecy
authentication
Jiang et al. (2016) [74] Burrows-Abadi-Needham Logic(BAN-logic) [195]
The improved scheme accomplishes mutual authentication
and key agreement between the user and sensor, the user,
and the gateway node
Farash et al. (2016) [75]
(i) Burrows-Abadi-Needham Logic
(BAN-logic) [195]
(ii) Automated Validation of Internet
Security Protocols and Application
(AVISPA) security analyzer [194]
Prove that the scheme allows a user to establish a session
key with a sensor node of his choice near the end of the
authentication process
Srinivas et al. (2017)
[144]
(i) Burrows-Abadi-Needham Logic
(BAN-logic) [195]
(ii) Automated Validation of Internet
Security Protocols and Application
(AVISPA) security analyzer [194]
The scheme can resist numerous security attacks, which
include the attacks, found in Amin and Biswas’s scheme
[70]
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Table 16: Continued.
Protocol Approach Main results
Kumari et al. (2016) [76] Burrows-Abadi-Needham Logic(BAN-logic) [195]
The scheme provides secure mutual authentication
between a legal user and an accessed sensor node inside
WSN or not
Jiang et al. (2017) [77] Burrows-Abadi-Needham Logic(BAN-logic) [195]
Prove that an identity and a session key is agreed
between the user and the sensor
Wu et al. (2016) [146] The security of the protocol is analyzedusing the ProVerif tool [191]
The scheme passes the verifications according to the
Dolev-Yao model [196]
Das et al. (2016) [147]
(i) Burrows-Abadi-Needham Logic
(BAN-logic) [195]
(ii) Random oracle model
(iii) Automated Validation of Internet
Security Protocols and Application
(AVISPA) security analyzer [194]
Prove secure mutual authentication between a legal
user and an accessed sensor node
Das et al. (2016) [197]
Automated Validation of Internet
Security Protocols and Application
(AVISPA) security analyzer [194]
The scheme is free from man-in-the-middle and replay
attacks
(i) Machine to Machine
Communications (M2M)
(ii) Internet of Vehicles (IoV)
(iii) Internet of Energy (IoE)
(iv) Internet of Sensors (IoS)
Denition of
Denition of authentication
model
(i) Mutual
authentication
(ii) Perfect forward
secrecy
(iii) Anonymity
Denition of
attacks model
(i) Replay attack,
stolen smart card
attack
(ii) Privileged-insider
attack
(iii) Oine password
guessing attack
(iv) Impersonation
attack
(v) Sensor node
capture
Selection of
countermeasures
(i) Cryptographic
methods
(ii) Bloom Filter
(iii) Biometric
(iv) Smart card
(v) Fuzzy extractor
technique
(vi) Access polynomial
(vii) Chebyshev Chaotic
Maps
Proposition of
main phases
of the protocol
(i) Initialization
(ii) Authentication
(iii) Message
transmission
Security
analyses using
formal
security
verication
(i) ProVerif,
(ii) BAN-logic
(iii) AVISPA
(iv) Resistance to
attacks
Performance
evaluation
(i) Communication
overhead
(ii) Storage cost
(iii) Computation
complexity
(iv) Lower error rates
network model
(iv) and so on
(v) and so on
attack and so on
(iv) Untraceability
Figure 11: The realization processes of an authentication protocol for the IoT.
(6) Security analyses using formal security verification
(e.g., ProVerif, BAN-logic, and AVISPA).
(7) Performance evaluation (e.g., in terms of storage cost,
computation complexity, communication overhead,
and lower error rates).
Figure 12 presents the categorization of authentication
models for the IoT. We note that some of the papers may be
classified into multiple authentication models. We circum-
vented this ambiguity by classifying the papers according
to the IoT environment, as presented in Figure 13, that is,
(1) authentication protocols for M2M, (2) authentication
protocols for IoV, (3) authentication protocols for IoE, and
(4) authentication protocols for IoS.
5.1. Authentication Protocols for M2M. The surveyed papers
of authentication protocols for Machine to Machine com-
munications (M2M) as shown in Table 17 are published
between 2012 and 2016. In order to speed up the process of
authentication and avoid authentication signaling overload,
Lai et al. [61] focused on the problem of group authenti-
cation and key agreement for resource-constrained M2M
devices in 3GPP networks. Specifically, the authors proposed
a novel group-based lightweight authentication scheme for
resource constrained M2M, called GLARM. The network
model used in [61] is based on 3GPP standard with three
domains, including access networks, evolved packet core, and
non-3GPP domain, for example, Internet. To guarantee the
entity mutual authentication and secure key agreement, the
GLARM scheme uses twomain phases, namely, (1) Initializa-
tion phase and (2) Group authentication and key agreement
phase. In addition, the GLARM scheme can ensure QoS for
machine-type communications devices, but the computation
complexity is much less than schemes [32, 38, 46]. In order
to distinguish between different physical devices running the
same software and detecting mimic attacks, Chen et al. [62]
proposed an authentication protocol for the IoT, named S2M.
The S2M protocol uses tree main phases, namely, (1) audio-
handshake phase, (2) mixed-signal generation phase, and
(3) feature extraction and storage phase. S2M can achieve
variable distance authentication and active attack detection
using acoustic hardware (Speaker/Microphone) fingerprints.
In addition, S2M is efficient in terms of lower error rates
compared with DISWN [198], LDTLS [199], PLTEA [200],
and SeArray [201], but the performance of the methods in
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Table 17: Summary of authentication protocols for M2M.
Prot. Network model Goals Main processes Performances (+) and limitations(−)
Lai et al.
(2016) [61]
Based on 3GPP standard with
three domains, including,
access networks, evolved
packet core, and non-3GPP
domain, e.g., Internet
Guarantee the entity
mutual authentication and
secure key agreement
(i) Initialization phase
(ii) Group authentication
and key agreement phase
+ Resistance to DoS attack,
redirection attack, and
man-in-the-middle attack
+ Computation overheads are
fairly small
+ Computation complexity is
much less than schemes
[32, 38, 46]
+ Can ensure QoS for
machine-type communications
devices
− Some privacy models are not
analyzed such as location privacy
and identity privacy
− Storage costs is not considered
Chen et al.
(2017) [62] Two wireless devices
Achieving variable distance
authentication and active
attack detection
(i) Audio-handshake phase;
(ii) Mixed-signal
generation phase
(iii) Feature extraction and
storage phase
+ Efficient in terms of lower error
rates compared with DISWN
[198], LDTLS [199], PLTEA
[200], and SeArray [201]
+ Active attack detection (e.g.,
audio replay attack)
− Privacy-preserving is not
analyzed compared to the
GLARM scheme [61]
− Storage costs is not considered
Lai et al.
(2014) [46]
3GPP-WiMAX-Machine-type
Communication
Achieving mutual
authentication and key
agreement between all
Machine-type
Communication devices
(i) Initialization phase
(ii) Roaming phase
+ Efficient in terms of the
communication overhead
compared to the traditional
roaming authentication scheme
and the optimized roaming
authentication scheme in [34]
+ Efficient in terms of
computation complexity
compared to the scheme without
aggregation
− Resistance to attacks is not
studied
− Privacy-preserving is not
analyzed compared to the
GLARM scheme [61].
− Storage costs is not considered
Lai et al.
(2013) [38]
3GPP standard with three
domains, namely, access
network domain, serving
network domain and home
network domain
Guarantee
privacy-preservation and
key forward/backward
secrecy with
(i) Preparation and
initialization
(ii) Protocol execution for
the first equipment
(iii) Protocol execution for
the remaining equipment
of the same group
(iv) Group member
joining/leaving the group
+ Considers the data integrity
and ensure user privacy
+ Resistance to attacks (DoS
attack, redirection attack,
man-in-the-middle attack, and
replay attack)
+The overhead of authentication
message delivery of SE-AKA is
lower than other existing AKA
protocols
+The computational overhead is
larger than that of other
traditional protocols such as the
work [202]
+ Smaller storage costs than
others protocols
− Some privacy models are not
analyzed such as location privacy
and identity privacy
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Table 17: Continued.
Prot. Network model Goals Main processes Performances (+) and limitations(−)
Fu et al.
(2012) [34]
Mobile WiMAX networks
with an access service network
Achieving mutual
authentication and privacy
preservation, and resisting
the domino effect
(i) Predeployment phase
(ii) Initial authentication
phase
(iii) Handover
authentication phase
+ Efficient in terms of the
computational and
communication overhead
compared to three schemes
[39, 203, 204]
+ Considers the privacy
preservation.
− Storage costs is not considered
− Resistance to attacks is not
studied
− No threat model presented
− Error-detection and fault
tolerance are not considered
Sun et al.
(2015) [53]
Mobile users, home gateways,
and an M2M server
Achieving a mutual
authentication process in
machine-to machine home
network service
(i) Set-up
(ii) Registration phase
(iii) Login and
authentication phase
(iv) Update password phase
(v) Home gateway joins the
Time
Division-Synchronous
Code Division Multiple
Access network
+ Efficient in terms of the
amount of calculation and
communication volume
compared to the protocol in
[205].
+ Resistance to guessing attack,
stolen-verifier attack,
impersonation attack, and replay
attack
− Privacy-preserving is not
analyzed compared to the
GLARM scheme [61]
− Storage costs is not considered
− Lack nonrepudiation
compared to the PBA scheme in
[64]
Lai et al.
(2014) [47]
Roaming network architecture
with the home authentication
center (HAC), the trust
linking server (TLS), and the
visiting authentication server
(VAS)
(i) Providing a strong
anonymous access
authentication
(ii) Guarantee user tracking
on a disputed access request
(iii) Achieving anonymous
user linking and efficient
user revocation for
dynamic membership
(i) System initialization
(ii) Roaming
(iii) User tracking
algorithm
(iv) Anonymous user
linking
(v) User revocation
+ Efficient in terms of
communication overhead and
computation cost compared to
two strong anonymous schemes
[17, 26]
+ Considers the data integrity
and ensure user privacy
+ Resistance to attacks, namely,
Denial of Service (DoS) attack
and impersonation attack
− Some privacy models are not
analyzed such as location privacy
− Lack nonrepudiation
compared to the PBA scheme in
[64]
Zhu et al.
(2015) [137] Android smartphone devices
(i) Satisfy the
user-friendliness with a
reasonable false rejection
rate
(ii) Achieving an
authentication process for
Android smartphone
devices
(i) Feature-set extraction
and storing for registration
(ii) Dual-factor
authentication
+ Can enhance user-friendliness
+ Improve security without
adding extra hardware devices
− No threat model presented
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Figure 12: Categorization of authentication models for the IoT.
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Figure 13: Classification of authentication protocols for the IoT based on the IoT environment.
terms of privacy preservation is not analyzed, especially in
comparison to the GLARM scheme [61].
To authenticate a group of devices at the same time, Lai
et al. [46] proposed a scheme named SEGR. Based on roam-
ing phase, SEGR can achieving mutual authentication and
key agreement between all Machine-type Communication
(MTC) devices when a group ofMTC devices roams between
3GPP and WiMAX networks. SEGR is efficient in terms
of the communication overhead computation complexity
compared to the scheme in [34] and the scheme without
aggregation, but again a comparisonwith othermethods such
as the GLARM scheme [61] regarding privacy preservation is
missing. We also note that resistance to attacks of the SEGR
method is not studied in the article as well [46]. To guarantee
privacy preservation and key forward/backward secrecy, Lai
et al. [38] proposed an efficient group authentication and
key agreement protocol, called SE-AKA, which is based on
authentication and key agreement (AKA) protocol.The over-
head of authentication message delivery of SE-AKA is lower
than other existing AKA protocols, but the computational
overhead is larger than that of other traditional protocols
such as the work [202]. In addition, SE-AKA has smaller
storage costs than others AKA protocols. Similar to the SE-
AKA protocol, Lai et al. in [37] proposed a lightweight group
authentication protocol for M2M, called LGTH, which is
efficient in terms of the signaling and computation overhead
compared to the schemes [32, 228]. Similar to the SE-
AKA & LGTH protocols, Fu et al. [34] proposed a group-
based handover authentication scheme for mobile WiMAX
networks. Based on the handover authentication phase, the
work [34] is efficient in terms of the computational and
communication overhead compared to three schemes [202–
204], but the resistance to attacks is not studied and no threat
model is presented.
In order to achieve a mutual authentication process in
machine to machine home network service, Sun et al. [53]
proposed anM2M applicationmodel for remote access to the
intelligence home network service using the existing Time
Division-Synchronous Code Division Multiple Access (TD-
SCDMA) system.The protocol [53] is efficient in terms of the
amount of calculations needed and communication volume
compared to the protocol in [205], but the article lacks
a comparison of performance in terms of nonrepudiation
against other schemes such as the PBA [64]. To achieve the
authentication of mobile subscribers in the roaming service,
Lai et al. [47] proposed a conditional privacy-preserving
authenticationwith access linkability, calledCPAL.TheCPAL
can (1) provide a strong anonymous access authentication,
(2) guarantee user tracking on a disputed access request,
and (3) achieve anonymous user linking and efficient user
revocation for dynamic membership. The CPAL is efficient
in terms of communication overhead and computation cost
compared to two strong anonymous schemes [17, 26], but
privacy aspects are not analyzed such as location privacy.
Without adding any extra hardware devices, Zhu et al. [137]
proposed a dual-factor authentication scheme, called Duth,
designed for Android smartphone devices. Based on two
main processes, namely, (1) feature-set extraction and storing
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for registration and (2) dual-factor authentication, the Duth
scheme can satisfy the user-friendly requirements, alongwith
a reasonable false rejection rate, providing on the same time
an authentication process for Android smartphone devices.
Esfahani et al. [229] proposed a lightweight authentica-
tion scheme to ensure secure integration of Industrial Inter-
net of Things (IIoT) solutions. Specifically, the work [229]
considers an IIoT scenario where a machine equipped with
a Secure Element (SE), is authenticated by a network element
equipped with a Trusted Platform Module (TPM). Based
on two procedures, namely, (a) the registration procedure
and (b) the authentication procedure, the work [229] is
characterized by low computational cost, communication,
and storage overhead. However, based on the RF fingerprint
of MTC devices’ hardware, Zhao et al. [230] introduced the
MTC architecture, as well as a cross-layer authentication
scheme. The work [230] can facilitate the interoperation
of heterogeneous MTC networks. In addition, Qiu and
Ma [231] proposed an enhanced mutual authentication and
key establishment scheme for the M2M communications in
6LoWPAN networks. Compared to the protocol [230], the
work [231] is analyzed by the Protocol Composition Logic
(PCL).
Amin et al. [232] proposed an architecture which is
applicable for a distributed cloud environment using smart
card. Using AVISPA tool and BAN-logic model, the protocol
[232] is protected against user impersonation attack, replay
attack, and session key discloser attack. Recently, Islam et al.
[233] proposed a three-factor session initiation protocol (SIP)
formultimedia big fata communications.Through the formal
verification using the BAN-logic, the protocol is proved that
can provide user anonymity and untraceability. To protect
the confidential information in the device, Amin et al.
[234] proposed a mutual authentication and key negotiation
protocol. Based on the elliptic curve cryptography (ECC), the
protocol [234] provides the mutual authentication property
between the participants involved and provides a password
update facility to registered users.
5.2. Authentication Protocols for IoV. The surveyed papers
of authentication protocols for Internet of Vehicles (IoV)
as shown in Table 18 are published between 2013 and 2016.
Cespedes et al. in [39] considered the security association
between asymmetric links during Vehicle to Vehicle (V2V)
communications. More precisely, the authors proposed a
multihop authenticated proxy mobile IP scheme, called MA-
PMIP. Based on authentication phase and mobile router
revocation, MA-PMIP can achieve less location update cost
compared with the scheme [206] and the handover delay
lower than the scheme [206]. In addition, MA-PMIP can
achieve mutual authentication against authentication attacks
but the privacy-preserving is not analyzed compared to
the GLARM scheme [61]. In order to expedite message
authentication in VANET, Wasef and Shen [40] proposed
an expedite message authentication protocol, named EMAP.
Based on the revocation checking process, EMAP can over-
come the problem of the long delay incurred in checking the
revocation status of a certificate using a certificate revocation
list. EMAP is efficient in terms of computational complexity
of revocation status checking and the authentication delay
is constant and independent of the number of revoked
certificates. Therefore, the question we ask here is can these
protocols work well in the decentralized group model? The
authentication scheme proposed recently by Shao et al. in
[63] can answer this question where it can achieve two
requirements for threshold authentication, namely, distin-
guishability and efficient traceability. The protocol in [63]
is proven that is secured by three theorems; namely, (1) the
proposed group signature scheme satisfies unforgeability, (2)
the proposed group signature scheme satisfies anonymity,
and (3) the proposed theorem satisfies the traceability.
To achieve the nonrepudiation in IoV, Lyu et al. in [64]
proposed a lightweight authentication scheme called PBA.
Based on the idea of Merkle hash tree construction and self-
generated MAC storage, the PBA scheme can resist packet
losses and maintain high packet processing rate with low
storage overhead. The PBA is efficient in terms of overall
delay compared to the TESLA scheme in [162] and the VAST
scheme in [161]. Zhang et al. in [52] considers a VANET
with four main entities, that is, key generator center (KGC),
traffic management authority (TMA), RSUs, and vehicles.
Based on identity-based aggregate signatures, the protocol
in [52] can guarantee some properties such as message
authentication, nonrepudiation, message confidentiality, pri-
vacy, and traceability. Similar to the scheme [52], Zhang et
al. [65] proposed an efficient distributed aggregate privacy-
preserving authentication protocol, called DAPPA, which is
based on a new security tool called multiple-TA OTIBAS
(MTA-OTIBAS). The DAPPA protocol can guarantee the
conditional unlinkability, ideal tamper-proof device (TPD)
freeness, and key escrow freeness. In addition, the DAPPA
protocol is efficient compared to the ECDSA protocol in
[163] and more efficient than the IBA scheme in [52] on
average but lacks nonrepudiation compared to the PBA
scheme in [64]. Based on monolithically certified public
key and attributes, Dolev et al. [66] proposed an idea to
ensure the countermeasures against the man-in-the-middle
attack under the vehicle authentication. The work in [66] is
efficient in terms of iteration cost compared to other existing
Authenticated Key Exchange (AKE) protocols such as ISO-
KE [207] and SIGMA [208]. To defend against coordinated
cyber-physical attacks, Chan and Zhou [48] proposed a two-
factor cyber-physical device authentication protocol, which
can be applied in the IoV. Especially in the IoT, the vehicles
may join or leave the platoon at any time in the platoon-based
vehicular cyber-physical system. To guarantee anonymity of
platoon members, Lai et al. [54] proposed a secure group
setup and anonymous authentication scheme, named SGSA,
for platoon-based vehicular cyber-physical systems. Based
on the anonymous authentication with traceability phase,
the SGSA scheme can provide strong anonymous access
authentication.
Ferrag andAhmim [235] proposed a recent scheme based
on searchable encryption with vehicle proxy reencryption,
called ESSPR, for achieving privacy preservation of message
in the IoV environment. ESSPR is robust against eavesdrop-
ping attack, wormhole attack, packet analysis attack, packet
tracing attack, and replay attack.
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Table 18: Summary of authentication protocols for IoV.
Prot. Network model Goals Main processes Performances (+) and limitations(−)
Cespedes et al.
(2013) [39]
A vehicular
communications network
with Access Routers (ARs)
that connect the VANET to
external IP networks
Achieving mutual
authentication against
authentication attacks
(i) Key establishment
phase;
(ii) MR registration
phase;
(iii) Authentication
phase;
(iv) Mobile router
revocation
+ Considers the asymmetric
links in the VANET.
+ Achieving less location update
cost compared with the scheme
[206].
+The handover delay lower than
the one in the scheme [206].
+ Resistance to replay attack,
man-in-the-middle attack, and
denial of service (DoS) attack.
− Privacy-preserving is not
analyzed compared to the
GLARM scheme [61].
− Lack nonrepudiation
compared to the PBA scheme in
[64]
Shao et al.
(2016) [63]
VANET with some parties,
including, central authority,
tracing manager, many
RSUs, and many OBUs
Guarantee unforgeability,
anonymity, and traceability
Initialization stage;
Registration stage;
Join stage;
Sign stage;
Verify stage;
Trace stage
+ Efficient in terms of the
computational cost of three
operations, namely, Initialization,
Registration, and Trace.
+ Can prevent replay attacks.
− No comparison with other
schemes.
−The communication overhead
is not studied.
− Lack nonrepudiation
compared to the PBA scheme in
[64]
Lyu et al. (2016)
[64]
VANET with divide
messages into two types (1)
single-hop beacons and (2)
multi-hop traffic data.
Guarantee some properties
such as timely
authentication,
nonrepudiation, packet
losses resistant, and DoS
attacks resistant
(i) Chained keys
generation;
(ii) Position prediction;
(iii) Merkle hash tree
construction;
(iv) Signature generation
+ Considers the nonrepudiation.
+The computational cost
reduces with the increasing of
time frame.
+ Can resist packet losses.
+ Maintain high packet
processing rate with low storage
overhead.
− Privacy-preserving is not
analyzed compared to the
GLARM scheme [61]
Zhang et al.
(2016) [65]
Trusted authority (TA), a
number of RSUs and
vehicles
Guarantee the conditional
unlinkability, ideal
tamper-proof device (TPD)
freeness, key escrow
freeness
(i) Member secrets
generation;
(ii) Vehicle sign;
(iii) Message verification
and signature storage;
(iv) Trace internal
pseudo-identity (IPID)
and authentication key
update;
(v) On-Line update
+ Efficient in terms of message
authentication delay on average.
+ Considers privacy preserving.
+ Resistance to the side-channel
attack, false messages attack,
denial-of-service (DoS) attack,
and Sybil attack.
+ Efficient compared to the
ECDSA protocol in [163] and
more efficient than the IBA
scheme in [52] on average.
− Lack nonrepudiation
compared to the PBA scheme in
[64]
Security and Communication Networks 25
Table 18: Continued.
Prot. Network model Goals Main processes Performances (+) and limitations(−)
Zhang et al.
(2016) [52]
VANET with four main
entities, i.e., key generator
center (KGC), traffic
management authority
(TMA), RSUs and vehicles
Guarantee some properties
such as message
authentication,
nonrepudiation, message
confidentiality, privacy, and
traceability
(i) System setup;
(ii) Protocol for STP and
STK distribution;
(iii) Protocol for common
string synchronization;
(iv) Protocol for vehicular
communications
+ Efficient in terms of the average
message delay and the
verification delay.
+ Efficient in terms of
verification delay compared to
the scheme in [166].
+ Considers the nonrepudiation.
+ Resistance to attacks, namely,
message reply, message
modification, movement
tracking.
− Location privacy is not
considered
Dolev et al.
(2016) [66]
The vehicle network is
divided into the controller
area network (CAN), local
interconnect network
(LIN), and media oriented
system (MOST)
Ensure the
countermeasures against
the Man-in-the-Middle
attack under the vehicle
authentication
(i) System settings;
(ii) Certificate authority;
(iii) Vehicular attributes
+ Efficient in terms of iteration
cost compared to the existing
Authenticated Key Exchange
(AKE) protocols such as ISO-KE
[207] and SIGMA [208].
+ Resistance to attacks, namely,
Man-in-the-Middle attack and
impersonation attack.
− Privacy-preserving is not
analyzed compared to the
GLARM scheme [61]
Chan and
Zhou (2014)
[48]
Smart grid electric vehicle
ecosystem
Provides assurance of the
digital identity and the
device’s controllability in
the physical domain
(i) Communication
settings;
(ii) Cyber-physical device
authentication
+ Resistance to substitution
attacks.
− No comparison with other
schemes.
−The average message delay and
the verification delay are not
evaluated
5.3. Authentication Protocols for IoE. The surveyed papers
of authentication protocols for Internet of Energy (IoE) as
shown in Table 19 are published between 2011 and 2016.
We noted here that we have reviewed some authentication
protocols proposed for secure smart grid communications
in our survey in [219], namely, the schemes in [236]. In
this subsection, we will review only the works that are not
reviewed in the survey [219].
To provide multicast authentication in smart grid, Li and
Cao [28] proposed the scheme Tunable Signing and Verifica-
tion (TSV). Specifically, TSV combines Heavy signing light
verification (HSLV) and Light Signing Heavy Verification
(LSHV) to achieve a flexible tradeoff between the two. TSV
can reduce the storage cost, but the privacy-preserving is not
discussed and the reports’ confidentiality and integrity are not
considered compared to the scheme [49]. The smart meters
are planning to reduce the time intervals to 1min or even
less. For this, Li et al. [49] developed a Merkle-tree-based
authentication scheme to minimize computation overhead
on the smart meters. The work [49] is efficient in terms of
computation complexity of the HAN user and the neigh-
borhood gateway compared to the Rivest–Shamir–Adleman
(RSA)-based authentication scheme [237].Therefore, Li et al.
[138] fixed the single-point failure in smart grid by proposing
the idea of deploying a fault tolerance architecture to execute
the authentication approach without any additional configu-
ration or setup. Based on both main processes, namely, (1)
batch verification and trinary diagnose TreeBatch and (2)
signature amortization for Package Blocks, the work [138] can
legalize the data aggregation with tremendously less signing
and verification operations.
Nicanfar et al. [139] addressed the key management for
unicast andmulticast communications in the smart grid.The
work [154] proposed a scheme for the mutual authentication
between the smart grid utility network and Home Area
Network smart meters, called SGAS-I, which can increase
performance of the key management and does not cause
any security drawback. Based on the multicast key support
phase, SGAS-I can provide simplicity and low overhead,
but the reports’ confidentiality and integrity are considered
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Table 19: Summary of authentication protocols for IoE.
Prot. Network model Goals Main processes Performances (+) and limitations (−)
Li and Cao
(2011) [28]
Smart Grid with wide
multicast
applications, namely,
wide area protection,
demand-response,
operation and control,
and in-substation
protection
Provide multicast
authentication
(i) Key generation;
(ii) Signing;
(iii) Verification
+ Efficient in terms of hash or one-way
function invocations compared to the scheme
[209].
+ Resistance to message forgery attacks.
+ Can reduce the storage cost.
− Privacy-preserving is not discussed.
−The reports’ confidentiality and integrity are
not considered compared to the scheme [49]
Li et al. (2014)
[49]
Communication
between the home
area networks
(HANs) and the
neighborhood
gateway using WiFi
technology
(i) Detecting the
replay attacks;
(ii) Providing
authentication for the
source of electricity
consumption reports;
(iii) Guarantees the
reports’
confidentiality and
integrity
(i) System initialization;
(ii) Report generation;
(iii) Neighborhood
gateway authentication
+ Efficient in terms of computation complexity
of the HAN user and the neighborhood
gateway compared to the RSA-based
authentication scheme.
+ Efficient in terms of communication
overhead between the HAN user and the
neighborhood gateway compared to the
RSA-based authentication scheme.
+ Resistance to attacks, namely, replay attack,
message injection attack, message analysis
attack, and message modification attack.
+ Guarantees the reports’ confidentiality and
integrity compared to the scheme [28].
−The routing attacks are not considered such
as wormhole attack
Li et al. (2012)
[138]
The smart grid with
power generation,
power transmission,
and power
distribution
Providing the
authentication for
power usage data
aggregation in
Neighborhood Area
Network (NAN) with
fault tolerance
architecture.
(i) Key generation;
(ii) Signature generation;
(iii) Batch verification
and trinary diagnose
TreeBatch;
(iv) Signature
amortization for Package
Blocks
+ Makes significant performance gains in terms
of the communication and computation cost.
+ Considers the fault diagnosis.
− No threat model presented
Nicanfar et al.
(2011) [139]
(i) The data
communication in
outside of the Home
Area Network (HAN).
(ii) Some smart
meters and a utility
server under a
wireless mesh
network topology
Providing mutual
authentication
scheme to prevent
brute-force attacks,
replay attacks,
Man-In-The-Middle
(MITM) attack, and
Denial-of-Service
(DoS) attacks
(i) Initialization;
(ii) Ongoing
maintenance or Short
period key refreshment;
(iii) Long period key
refreshment;
(iv) Multicast key
support
+ Can provide simplicity and low overhead.
+ Resistance to attacks, namely, brute-force
attacks, replay attacks, Man-In-The-Middle
(MITM) attack, and Denial-of-Service (DoS)
attacks.
+ Can provide secure key management.
−The reports’ confidentiality and integrity are
considered compared to the scheme [49]
Chim et al.
(2011) [140]
Smart grid network
with three basic
layers, namely, power
generators,
substations, and
smart meters and
smart appliances
Guarantee the
message
authentication,
identity privacy, and
traceability
(i) Preparation module;
(ii) Pseudo-identity
generation module;
(iii) Signing module;
(iv) Verification module;
(v) Tracing module
+ Requires only an additional 368msec for
HMAC signature verification at a substation.
+ Efficient in overall normal traffic success rate
when under attack.
+The message overhead is only 20 bytes per
request message.
−The routing attacks are not considered such
as wormhole attack.
− Storage costs are not considered.
− No comparison with other schemes
Fouda et al.
(2011) [141]
Smart grid with the
power Distribution
Network (DN), the
Transmission
Substation (TS), and a
number of
Distribution
Substations (DSs)
Providing mutual
authentication and
achieving message
authentication in a
light-weight way
(i) Key generation;
(ii) Message generation;
(iii) Hash-based message
authentication
+ Efficient in terms of communication
overhead and message decryption/verification
delay compared to ECDSA-256.
+ Resistance to attacks, namely, replay attack,
chosen-plaintext attack, and collision attack.
− Location privacy is not considered.
− Identity privacy and traceability are not
considered compared to the scheme [140]
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Table 19: Continued.
Prot. Network model Goals Main processes Performances (+) and limitations (−)
Nicanfar et al.
(2014) [142]
Multigate
communication
network proposed in
[210]
Providing mutual
authentication and
key management
mechanisms
(i) SGMA scheme
(System setup; Mutual
authentication Scheme)
(ii) SGKM protocol (Key
refreshment; Multicast
key mechanism;
Broadcast key
mechanism)
+ Can prevent the adversary from
continuing the successful attack.
+ Can prevent various attacks while
reducing the management overhead.
− Storage costs are not considered.
− Lack nonrepudiation compared to the
PBA scheme in [64]
Chim et al.
(2015) [55]
Smart grid network
based on hierarchical
architecture, i.e.,
HANs, BANs, NANs
Providing the
privacy-preserving
recording and
gateway-assisted
authentication
(i) Preparation phase;
(ii) Power plan
submission phase;
(iii) Power plan
processing phase;
(iv) Reconciliation
phase;
(v) System master secret
updating phase
+The message filtering at gateway smart
meters can be helpful in reducing the impact
of attacking traffic.
+The privacy preserving and traceability are
considered.
− No comparison with other schemes.
− Distributed denial of service (DDoS)
attacks is not considered
Mahmood et
al. (2016) [67]
The system model is
homogeneous to the
model in [49]
Detect and omit some
attacks, namely,
replay, false message
injection, message
analysis and
modification attacks
(i) Initialization;
(ii) Authentication;
(iii) Message
transmission
+ Efficient in terms of communication cost
and computation cost compared to the
schemes [30, 35].
+ Resistance to attacks, namely, replay, false
message injection, message analysis and
modification attacks.
+The reports’ confidentiality and integrity
are considered.
− Location privacy is not considered
compared to the scheme [49]. To guarantee the message
authentication with identity privacy and traceability, Chim et
al. [140] proposed a scheme, called PASS, for the hierarchical
structure of a smart grid. The PASS scheme focuses only
on the substation-to-consumer subsystem where the real
identity of any smart appliance can only be known by the
control center using the concept of pseudo identity. Similar
to the PASS scheme, Fouda et al. [141] proposed a scheme
that can only provide an authenticated and encrypted channel
for the late successive transmission but can also establish
a semantic-secure shared key in the mutual authentication
environment. The work in [141] is efficient in terms of com-
munication overhead and message decryption/verification
delay compared to ECDSA-256, but the identity privacy and
traceability are not considered compared to the scheme [140].
In order to provide the mutual authentication between
smart meters and the security and authentication server
in the smart grid using passwords, Nicanfar et al. [142]
proposed a mutual authentication scheme and a key man-
agement protocol, called SGMAand SGKM, respectively.The
SGMA scheme concentrates on data communications over
the advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) outside of the
HAN domain, where each node has a unique ID and each
smart meter has a unique serial number SN embedded by the
manufacturer and an initial secret password. On the other
hand, the SGKM protocol concentrates on node-to-node
secure communications, where the nodes have the appropri-
ate private–public keys to be used for unicast. Based on the
multicast key mechanism, the SGMA scheme can prevent
various attacks while reducing themanagement overhead but
lack nonrepudiation compared to the PBA scheme in [64].
Shim et al. [55] consider a smart grid network based on
hierarchical architecture, that is, HANs, BANs, and NANs.
The work [55] proposed privacy-preserving recording and
gateway-assisted authentication of power usage information.
The message filtering at gateway smart meters can be helpful
in reducing the impact of attacking traffic. Similar to the
scheme [55], Mahmood et al. [67] proposed a lightweight
message authentication scheme. Based on two main pro-
cesses, namely, (1) authentication and (2) message transmis-
sion, the scheme [67] can detect and omit some attacks,
namely, replay, false message injection, message analysis,
and modification attacks. In addition, the scheme [67] is
efficient in terms of communication cost and computation
cost compared to the schemes [30, 35], but the location
privacy is not considered.
5.4. Authentication Protocols for IoS. The surveyed papers
of authentication protocols for Internet of Sensors (IoS) as
shown in Table 20 are published in 2016. We noted here that
we have reviewed some authentication protocols proposed
for ad hoc social network (an application of WSN) in our
survey in [220]. In this subsection, we will review only the
works that are not reviewed in the survey [220] and the
articles published in 2016 related to authentication protocols
for IoS. For more details about the articles published before
2016,we refer the reader to six surveys published in 2013, 2014,
and 2015, namely, [238–243].
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Table 20: Summary of authentication protocols for IoS (Published in 2016).
Prot. Network model Goals Main processes Performances (+) and limitations(−)
Kumari et al.
(2016) [68]
Wireless sensor network
(WSN) with the service
seeker users, sensing
component sensor nodes
(SNs) and the service
provider base-station or
gateway node (GWN)
Providing mutual
authentication with
forward secrecy and wrong
identifier detection
mechanism at the time of
login
(i) Initialization phase;
(ii) User registration phase;
(iii) Login phase;
(iv) Authentication & key
agreement phase;
(v) Password change phase
+The user is anonymous.
+ Resistance to attacks, namely, user
impersonation attack, password
guessing attack, replay attack, stolen
verifier attack, smart card loss
attack, session-specific temporary
information attack, GWN Bypass
attack, and privileged insider attack.
+ Provides a secure session-key
agreement and forward secrecy.
+ Provides freely password
changing facility.
+ Efficient in unauthorized login
detection with wrong identity and
password.
−The data integrity is not
considered
Chung et al.
(2016) [69]
Wireless sensor networks
for roaming service
Providing an enhanced
lightweight anonymous
authentication to resolve
the security weaknesses of
the scheme [60]
(i) Registration phase;
(ii) Login and
authentication phase;
(iii) Password change phase
+ Considers anonymity, hop-by-hop
authentication, and untraceability.
+ Resistance to attacks, namely,
password guessing attack,
impersonation attack, forgery
attack, known session key attack,
and fair key agreement.
− Location privacy is not considered
Gope and
Hwang (2016)
[71]
Real-time data access in
WSNs
Ensuring the user
anonymity, perfect forward
secrecy, and resiliency of
stolen smart card attacks
(i) Registration phase;
(ii) Anonymous
authentication and key
exchange phase;
(iii) Password renewal
phase;
(iv) Dynamic node
addition phase
+ Considers the user anonymity
and untraceability.
+ Provides perfect forward secrecy.
+ Security assurance in case of lost
smart card.
+ Resilience against node capture
attack and key compromise
impersonation Attack.
−The average message delay and the
verification delay are not evaluated
Chang and Le
(2016) [73]
Users, sensor nodes, and
gateway node in WSN
Providing mutual
authentication and perfect
forward secrecy
(i) Registration phase;
(ii) Authentication phase;
(iii) Password changing
phase
+ Considers the session key
security, perfect forward secrecy,
and user anonymity.
+ Resistance to attacks, namely,
replay attack and smart card lost
attack.
+ Efficient in terms of computation
cost in the authentication phases
compared to the schemes
[42, 50, 51, 211].
− Privacy-preserving is not
analyzed compared to the GLARM
scheme [61].
Jiang et al.
(2016) [74]
Users, sensor nodes, and
gateway node in WSN.
Providing mutual
authentication, anonymity,
and untraceability
(i) Registration phase;
(ii) Login and
authentication phase
+ Provides mutual authentication,
session key agreement, user
anonymity, and user untraceability.
+ Resistance to attacks, namely,
smart card attack, impersonation
attack, modification attack,
man-in-the-middle attack, and
tracking attack.
−Wormhole attack and blackhole
attack are not considered
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Table 20: Continued.
Prot. Network model Goals Main processes Performances (+) and limitations(−)
Farash et al.
(2016) [75]
Users, sensor nodes, and
gateway node in WSN
Providing the user
authentication with
traceability protection and
sensor node anonymity
(i) Predeployment phase;
(ii) Registration phase;
(iii) Login and
authentication phase;
(iv) Password change phase
+ Efficient in terms of
communication, computation and
storage cost compared to the
scheme [51]
+ Resistance to attacks, namely,
replay attack, privileged-insider
attack, man-in-the-middle attack,
insider and stolen verifier attack,
smart card attack, impersonation
attack, bypassing attack, many
logged-in users with the same
login-id attack, password change
attack, and DoS attack.
−Wormhole attack and blackhole
attack are not considered
Kumari et al.
(2016) [76]
Users, sensor nodes, and
gateway node in WSN
Providing the mutual
authentication with
traceability and anonymity
(i) Offline sensor node
registration phase;
(ii) User registration phase;
(iii) Login phase;
(iv) Authentication and key
agreement phase;
(v) Password update phase;
(vi) Dynamic sensor node
addition phase
+ Efficient in terms of end-to-end
delay (EED) (in seconds) and
throughput (in bps).
+ Efficient in terms of computation
cost in login and authentication
phases compared to both schemes
Turkanovic´ et al. [51] and Farash et
al. [75].
+ Resistance to attacks, namely,
replay attack, stolen smart card
attack, privileged-insider attack,
offline password guessing attack,
impersonation attack, and sensor
node capture attack.
−Wormhole attack and blackhole
attack are not considered.
− Lack nonrepudiation compared to
the PBA scheme in [64].
Sun et al.
(2016) [145]
Multicast communications
in WSNs, including, sink
and many groups, and each
group has a powerful node
and many low ordinary
nodes
Providing the broadcast
authentication and
enhanced collusion
resistance
(i) Initialization;
(ii) Broadcast;
(iii) Group keys’ recovery
and pairwise keys’
updating;
(iv) Node addition;
(v) Node revocation
+ Collusion resistance
+ Resistance to attacks, namely,
PKE-attack and PF-attack.
−The end-to-end delay and
throughput are not evaluated
compared to the scheme [76].
− Replay attack is not considered
Jiang et al.
(2017) [77]
Users, sensor nodes, and
gateway node in WSN
Achieving mutual
authentication among the
communicating agents with
user anonymity and
untraceability
(i) Registration phase;
(ii) Login phase;
(iii) Authentication phase;
(iv) Password change phase
+ Resistance to attacks,
stolen-verifier attack, guessing
attack, impersonation attack,
modification attack,
man-in-the-middle attack, and
replay attack.
−The end-to-end delay and
throughput are not evaluated
compared to the scheme [76].
− Collusion resistance is not
considered compared to the scheme
[145]
Kumari et al. [68] reviewed and examined both schemes
proposed by Li et al. in [42] and He et al. in [57] for its
suitability to WSNs. Based on the results of this analysis,
the authors proposed a chaotic maps based user-friendly
authentication scheme for WSN with forward secrecy and
wrong identifier detection mechanism at the time of login.
The idea is to establish a session key between user and sensor
node (SN) using extended chaotic maps. The scheme of
Kumari et al. [68] is efficient in unauthorized login detection
withwrong identity andpassword, but the data integrity is not
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considered. Similar to [68], Chung et al. [69] reviewed and
examined the scheme [60]. Based on the security weaknesses
of the scheme [60], the work [69] proposed an enhanced
lightweight anonymous authentication scheme for a scalable
localization roaming service in WSN. Using three phases,
namely, (1) registration phase, (2) login and authentication
phase, and (3) password change phase, the work [69] can
provide anonymity, hop-by-hop authentication, and untrace-
ability, but location privacy is not considered.
Jan et al. [143] proposed an extremely lightweight
payload-based mutual authentication, called PAWN, for the
cluster-based hierarchical WSN.The PAWN scheme is based
on two main phases, namely, (1) token-based cluster head
election and (2) payload-based mutual authentication. With
phase 1, the higher-energy nodes perform various admin-
istrative tasks such as route discovery, route maintenance,
and neighborhood discovery. The authentication procedure
is accomplished using the cooperative neighbor × neighbor
(CNN) [244], that is, session initiation, server challenge,
client response and challenge, and server response. The
PAWN scheme is efficient in terms of average energy con-
sumption andHandshake duration compared to the LEACH-
C scheme in [245] and the SecLEACH scheme [246], but
the privacy preservation is not analyzed compared to other
methods, such as the GLARM scheme [61]. Based on the
security weaknesses of the scheme [51], Amin andBiswas [70]
proposed a secure lightweight scheme for user authentication
and key agreement in multigateway based WSN.The scheme
[70] is efficient in terms of computational cost, storage, and
communication cost compared to the schemes [31, 36, 41, 45,
51]. In addition, the scheme [70] can providemuch less energy
consumption of the sensor nodes and user anonymity.
For the security of real-time data access in WSNs, Gope
and Hwang [71] proposed an authentication protocol to
ensure the user anonymity, perfect forward secrecy, and
resiliency of stolen smart card attacks. The protocol [71]
is efficient in terms of computational and communication
cost compared to the schemes [31, 41, 72, 190, 247]. Based
on the security weaknesses of the scheme [190], Das [72]
proposed a secure and robust temporal credential-based
three-factor user authentication scheme. The scheme [72]
uses a biometric password and smart card of a legal user.
The simulation results of the scheme [72] demonstrate that
it is efficient in terms of computational and communication
overhead compared to the schemes [41, 248, 249]. Based on
the weaknesses in Turkanovic´ et al.’s protocol [51], Chang and
Le [73] proposed a flexible authentication protocol using the
smart card for WSNs, which operates in two modes, namely,
(1) providing a lightweight authentication scheme and (2)
an advanced protocol based on ECC, which provides perfect
forward secrecy. Both these two modes are efficient in terms
of computation cost in the authentication phases compared
to the schemes [42, 50, 51, 211].
Trying to deal with the weaknesses of the scheme pre-
sented in [57], Jiang et al. [74] proposed an untraceable two-
factor authentication scheme based on elliptic curve cryptog-
raphy. The scheme [74] is efficient in terms of computational
cost compared to previous schemes [31, 50, 57, 211, 250], but
the performance of the system under common attacks such
as the wormhole attack and the blackhole attack is not pre-
sented. Based on the weaknesses in the scheme [51], Farash
et al. [75] proposed an efficient user authentication and key
agreement scheme for heterogeneouswireless sensor network
tailored for the Internet of Things environment. The scheme
[75] is efficient in terms of communication, computation,
and storage cost compared to the scheme [51], but again the
performance of the system under the wormhole attack or the
blackhole attack is not presented. Based on the weaknesses in
Amin and Biswas’s scheme [70], Srinivas et al. [144] proposed
a user authentication scheme for multigateway WSNs. The
scheme [144] is efficient in terms of communication overhead
during the login and authentication phase compared to the
schemes [21, 70], but the performance of the system in
terms of privacy preservation is not analyzed compared to
previous methods, such as the GLARM scheme [61]. Similar
to both schemes [74, 144], Kumari et al. [76] pointed out
that the scheme of Farash et al. [75] is insecure against some
attacks. The work presented in [76] especially is efficient not
only in terms of end-to-end delay (EED) (in seconds) and
throughput (in bps), but also in terms of computation cost in
login and authentication phases compared to both schemes
by Turkanovic´ et al. [51] and Farash et al. [75].
Sun et al. [145] considered the multicast communications
in WSNs, including, sink and many groups, where each
group may have a powerful node and many low ordinary
nodes. The powerful node acts as the group manager (GM)
and is responsible for network security management, such
as key issues, updating, revocation, and intrusion detection.
Then, the authors reviewed and examined the scheme [188]
in order to propose a scheme that considers the forward
security, backward security, and collusion resistance. Based
on the idea of access polynomial, the Sun et al. scheme [145]
is efficient in terms of storage, computation, and commu-
nication overhead, but the replay attack is not considered.
Jiang et al. proposed a scheme [77] that can achieve mutual
authentication among the communicating agents with user
anonymity and untraceability. In addition, the Jiang et al.
scheme [77] is efficient in terms of computational cost
compared to the schemes in [31, 50, 211, 250], but the collusion
resistance is not considered compared to the scheme in [145].
Based on the weaknesses in the scheme [251], Wu et
al. [146] proposed an improved three-factor authentication
scheme for WSNs, which can be resistant to the desyn-
chronization attack. Das et al. [147] reviewed the recently
proposed Chang–Le’s two protocols [73] and then showed
that their protocols are insecure against some known attacks.
Liu and Chung [148] proposed a secure user authentication
scheme for wireless healthcare sensor networks, which is
efficient in terms of computation cost compared to both
schemes in [252, 253]. Gope et al. [254] proposed a special
idea for resilience of DoS attacks in designing anonymous
user authentication protocol. Combining three techniques,
namely, smart card, password, and personal biometrics, Das
et al. [197] proposed a three-factor user authentication and
key agreement scheme based on multigateway WSN archi-
tecture. The scheme [197] is efficient in terms of computa-
tional, communication, and energy costs. Benzaid et al. [255]
proposed an accelerated verification of digital signatures
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generated by BNN-IBS [256], which is an idea inspired by the
acceleration technique of Fan and Gong [257].
6. Open Issues
6.1. M2M Open Issues. M2M communications can facilitate
many applications, like e-health, smart grids, industrial
automation, and environmental monitoring but on the same
time face various security threats and trust issues. In e-
health especially authentication of the devices must be
robust to attacks that could threaten the correct exchange
of information and consequently the life of the patient.
In order to safely share and manage access to informa-
tion in the healthcare system, it is essential to be able to
authenticate users, including organizations and people. In
Australia authentication is achieved through the use of digital
certificates that conform to the Australian Government
endorsed Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) standard, through
the National Authentication Service for Health (NASH), but
thorough research of the resistance to attacks of this and other
similar systems is needed in order to reassure its robustness.
Scalability and Heterogeneity are a rather general problem
when dealing with M2M communication of devices that
come from different vendors and using different operating
systems. Solutions that focus only to Android devices [137]
cannot guarantee end-to-end security of the system.
6.2. IoV Open Issues. Although a number of authentication
protocols have been proposed recently which are capable of
guaranteeing authentication for a network of vehicles, there
are still open issues that need to be addressed by the research
community.
6.2.1. Autonomous Driving. Until now anonymity of platoon
members has been addressed in [54], which is capable of
providing strong anonymous access authentication to the
members of the platoon. Taking one step further and dealing
with full automated vehicles that will be able to create
platoons on the fly, with no central entity or trust authority
in reach, novel authentication methods where vehicles can
run by themselves must be developed. This could be done
using several techniques. Onemethod would be to use digital
signatures, where each vehicle holds its own signing key and
can verify its identity by signing challenges, combined with
a defense mechanism that can face MITM attacks. Other
methods could be the use of the trust levels of every vehicle
using methods similar to [258].
6.2.2. Heterogeneous Vehicular Networking. The design,
development, and deployment of vehicular networks
are boosted by recent advances in wireless vehicular
communication techniques, such as dedicated short-range
communications (DSRC), Long-Term Evolution (LTE),
IEEE 802.11p, andWorldwide Interoperability for Microwave
Access (WiMax). Novel protocols that can be deployed
on all these communication channels and can guarantee
authentication under attacks that can be initiated from
each one of these networks are an area of future research.
Safeguarding one communication channel without dealing
with the threats that all these networks face will leave the IoV
vulnerable to several kinds of attacks against authentication.
6.2.3. Social Internet of Vehicles. Social Internet of Vehicles
(SIoV) describes the social interactions both among vehicles
[259] and among drivers [260]. Ensuring authentication in
the communication among vehicles cannot guarantee full
protection of identities of entities if the social notion of
communication is neglected [125]. Future authentication-
enhancing technologies for SIoVs should be based on proven
authentication-enhancing technologies for social networks
and vehicular networks.
6.3. IoE Open Issues. Based on the definition of the Internet
of Energy as an integrated dynamic network infrastructure
based on standard and interoperable communication proto-
cols that interconnect the energy network with the Internet
allowing units of energy to be dispatchedwhen andwhere it is
needed, it is easily understood that authentication in the IoE
environment is not an easy problem to solve. IoE combines
M2M, V2G, IIoT (industrial Internet of things), Smart home
automation, cloud services, and IoS. It would be better to
define IoE as an application of the IoT on the Energy domain.
Authentication on the IoE domain cannot be reassured with-
out dealing with each of the aforementioned subdomains.
Security [261] and hardware [262] authentication techniques
along with solutions dealing with middleware security [263]
must be combined.
6.4. IoS Open Issues. The major problems that the IoS
networks have to face are energy efficiency and security assur-
ance of the sensors. Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) and
energy efficient mechanisms are not thoroughly investigated
and resolved in the surveyed authentication protocols for the
IoS. Raza et al. [264] proposed an idea based on real-time
intrusion detection for the IoT, called SVELTE. Mechanisms
that can extend the SVELTE scheme for the IoS in order to
be energy efficient would be a possible research direction.
Hence, future works addressing both security, mainly IDSs,
and energy will have an important contribution for the
authentication protocols. In addition, we believe further
research is needed to develop a new framework for combining
intrusion detection systems and authentication protocols for
detecting and avoiding attacks in IoS.
6.5. Pattern Recognition and Biometrics for the IoT. Hybrid
authentication protocols are based on two methods for
identifying an individual, including, knowledge-based (e.g.,
the passwords) and token-based (e.g., the badges). Each
method has its weakness; that is, (1) the password can be
forgotten or guessed by an adversary and (2) the badge
can be lost or stolen. Nevertheless, the safest way is the
use of biometric characteristics because two people cannot
possess exactly the same biometric characteristic. Hence,
future works addressing pattern recognition authentication
techniques along with biometrics will have an important
contribution in improving authentication in the IoT. Recently
new promising efforts that apply biometrics on IoT have been
proposed [265] and the term of Internet of biometric things
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(IoBT) has been introduced [266]. Biometric technology on
the other hand raises privacy and ethical issues that need to be
taken in mind when designing new authentication protocols,
especially for applications that deal with critical data [267].
6.6. Authentication for the IoT Applications in 5G. The
development of 5G networks is driven by IoT connectivity,
where the IoT applications have been categorized into two
classes: massive machine-type communications (mMTC)
and ultrareliable low-latency communications (URLLC), as
discussed by Schulz et al. [268]. As mobile devices will be
connected to the network all the time, the IoT applications
can more easily be tracked down and are more vulnerable to
several types of attacks, like impersonation, eavesdropping,
man-in-the middle, denial of service, replay, and repudiation
attack [269]. One possible future direction is to develop an
authentication protocol for the IoT applications in 5G.
6.7. Lessons Learned. From the threat models in M2M, IoV,
IoE, and IoS,we found thirty-five attacks discussed by the sur-
veyed protocols.Therefore, we were able to classify the formal
security verification techniques into five techniques, namely,
BAN-logic, analysis by process, Game Theory, Automated
reasoning (ProVerif), and Automated Validation (AVISPA).
In addition, based on the cryptosystems, we were able to
classify the authentication protocols for the IoT into three
categories, namely, symmetric-cryptosystembased protocols,
asymmetric-cryptosystem-based protocols, and hybrid pro-
tocols.
After conducting a comprehensive survey of authenti-
cation protocols, we see that the reliability of an authen-
tication protocol depends not only on the effectiveness of
the cryptography method used against attacks but also on
the computation complexity and communication overhead.
Therefore, in order to guarantee authentication between the
machines for the IoT, we invite well-positioned researchers
and practitioners to propose authentication frameworks that
cover not only one but three layers, namely, the application
layer, the network layer, and the sensing layer. In this paper,
we also see a need for a comprehensive survey for privacy-
preserving schemes for the IoT under four environments,
including, M2M, IoV, IoE, and IoS.
Authentication protocols for the IoT may be improved
in terms of (1) addressing both the authentication and
privacy problem, (2) developing efficient IDSs, (3) improving
the computation complexity of the proposed methods, (4)
improving the communication overhead of the methods, (5)
developing of formal security verification techniques, (6)
accounting of the process of detecting and avoiding attacks,
and (7) capturing of experts opinion in the field of computer
security.
7. Conclusion
In this paper a structured comprehensive overview of authen-
tication protocols for the IoT is presented. These protocols
can be categorized based on the target environment, for
example, Machine to Machine Communications (M2M),
Internet of Vehicles (IoV), Internet of Energy (IoE), and
Internet of Sensors (IoS). Major threats, countermeasures,
and formal security verification techniques used by state-
of-the-art authentication protocols are presented. A side-by-
side comparison in a tabular form for the current state-of-
the-art of authentication protocols proposed for M2M, IoV,
IoE, and IoS is also provided. Based on this analysis future
research directions are given. Authentication protocols for
the IoTmay be improved in terms of being able to cover both
authentication and privacy and be more efficient in terms
of computation complexity and communication overhead as
long as they are able to cooperate with other mechanisms for
detecting and avoiding attacks in the IoT.
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